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Online intermediaries along with their IT-enabled features have ushered a new era 
for the human society. It has affected all aspects of life from cultivating intimate 
relationships to unintentionally causing societal challenges. Particularly, online platforms 
allow users to engage in online market places, where certain platforms allow men and 
women to connect with each other to pursue inter personal exchanges. For example, 
online dating platforms allow singles looking for mates, find partners who agree to go for 
dates, where consensual intimate sexual experiences, like hook ups, can be a 
consequential outcome. In another situation, in online classified advertisement platforms, 
sex workers can illegally post ads to solicitate clients. The characteristics of online 
platforms along with their IT-enabled features have influenced this process. This 
dissertation examines two questions looking at such interactions in a causal manner. First, 
it studies the impact of entry of an online classified advertisement platform, Craigslist, on 
prostitution trends, which is an unintentional consequence of website operation. Second, 
the dissertation looks at the impact of an important IT-enabled feature, the vote-identity 
revelation feature, on user engagement and matching outcomes in dating websites. 
In literature concerning sexuality and economics, we find that sexual interactions 
between men and women can be looked at using an economic approach (Baumeister and 
Vohs 2004). From the seminal research stream based on Nobel laureate Gary Becker’s 
(1976) framework, we know that human behavior follows four main assumptions. First, 





costs and benefits of situations. Second, market influences the allocation of scarce but 
coveted resources. Third, the rule of competition guides seller’s behavior. Finally, 
individuals seek to maximize their outcomes. Using this economic framework, 
Baumeister and Vohs (2004) modeled negotiations concerning sexual activities as 
economic decisions, where men and women are participants in the role of buyers and 
sellers in a marketplace. This model encapsulates prostitution as a bare-bone type of 
sexual exchange, whereby clients give sex workers money in return of sexual favors. It 
also explains dating and courtship as a process where eventually men use persuasion to 
engage in sexual activities with their female partners. From an economic point of view, 
men invest in time and resources towards their female partners, like buying them gifts, in 
order to negotiate sexual favors (Baumeister and Vohs 2004). This dissertation builds 
upon the economic approach on human sexuality as mentioned in Baumeister and Vohs 
(2004), and looks at the market of dating and prostitution in online exchange scenarios. 
The internet and its online platforms with IT-enabled features can provide design 
elements to facilitate an online marketplace. These online market “clearing houses” can 
facilitate the activities of finding a partner for intimate relationships. Accordingly, the 
dissertation relates to the extant literature on online intermediaries. The IT-enabled 
features available inside online intermediaries can impact the payoffs and cost dynamics 
faced by men and women on both sides of the market. Extant literature on platform 
economics posits that online intermediaries bring about reduced search costs (Bakos 





temporal boundaries (Bailey and Bakos 1997), and provide a broader base of product 
offerings (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). For these set of reasons, online intermediaries can 
make it easy for men to find sex workers or find strangers to date. First, platforms allow 
their users to experience various cost reductions of participating in dating and prostitution 
markets. Second, men and women can use online communication features to better gauge 
their interpersonal affordances and strike an efficient deal. Past research in e-commerce 
has found that well-designed websites are able to facilitate greater purchase intentions 
(Hausman and Siekpe 2009). Online features such as product presentation formats (Jiang 
and Benbasat 2007), product comparison tools (Häubl and Trifts 2000), and online 
product reviews (Zhu and Zhang 2010) that are incorporated in online sites can boost 
online purchase significantly. Similarly, when making decision on an intimate partner, 
users can access key information about their potential partner through online site features 
and make an informed and safe decision. Whether a john negotiates a price with a sex 
worker, or a young man asks his likable other out for a date, the online websites can 
provide design features to facilitate each process. Third, as an online aggregator, online 
platforms offer a broader variety of products and services compared to the physical 
stores. Online platforms facilitate the long tail phenomenon (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011), by 
which consumers with specialized preferences can discover and locate niche products 
through online search tools. For example, johns and single men searching online for a sex 
worker or a date, are not limited to a specific ethnicity. Nonconventional preferences 





explores the role of online intermediaries at facilitating the diverse yet similar markets of 
prostitution and dating. 
In my first essay, I tackle a macroscopic view on how internet is transforming the 
sex trade. Extant literature has portrayed that internet acts as a hub for sex work by 
providing an intermediation role (Perer 2012).  Accordingly, it facilitates information 
exchange between buyers and sellers of sexual services. One such online platform 
engaged in facilitating the market for sex work was Craigslist, the earliest and largest 
online classified website for this market. Utilizing Craigslist’s expansion in the United 
States as a natural experiment my first essay tries to quantify the economic impact due to 
Craigslist’s entry on prostitution trends. Further, it examines the potential pathways in 
which the Craigslist website could affect the market for sex workers. 
To study the potential pathways, we look at independent sex workers and sex 
workers who are operating under organized crime agencies. It is of interest to identify 
which cohort of sex workers are gaining from posting sexual services advertisements in 
Craigslist’s portal. Further, we check whether Craigslist’s entry caused uptake in 
prostitution in markets with no history of sex work or that having a culture of 
prostitution. In a similar sense, we look for impact of Craigslist’s entry along geographic 
spillovers of sex work, encouragement of sexual types in offer, market for new entrants, 
domain for police sting operations, and last but not the least, how Craigslist 
advertisement channels impact sex work. The study uses a difference-in-difference 





year fixed effects on a panel data set consisting of 1796 counties from 1999 to 2008. 
Further, the analysis includes covariates to control for demographic characteristics, socio-
economic factors, and crime related factors. In sum, our approach aims to derive a causal 
view of the proposed relationship. 
In the second essay, using a microscopic view we look at how IT enabled 
technologies impact human relationships in an online dating market. Specifically, we 
study the impact of a popular IT-enabled feature called the vote-identity revelation 
feature on online dating users’ engagement and matching outcomes. In this study we use 
a randomized field experiment on users of one of the largest online dating websites in 
United States, where the intervention reveals voter’s identity-descriptive information. 
The study looks for both main treatment effects and more importantly heterogeneity in 
treatment effects along the following dimensions – gender, age groups, ethnicity, and 
body type.  
We are further interested to look for heterogeneity in impact of the vote-identity 
revelation feature along user’s attractiveness dimension. Extant literature on 
attractiveness finds that attractive people do better than unattractive people (Eagly et al. 
1991). As a consequence, attractive individuals can become selective given that they have 
access to more alternatives. Accordingly, the essay looks at the impact of the treatment 
when interacted with user’s own attractiveness, user’s average voters’ attractiveness, and 
both. With regards to the effect of user’s own attractiveness, we expect to see an “ego 





considering user’s average voters’ attractiveness, we expect to see an “encouragement 
effect” due to votes from highly attractive voters.  
The thesis makes contribution to show the dichotomy in use of IT-enabled 
technologies which can facilitate both legal and illegal markets. On one hand, websites 
dedicated to online dating have improved substantially the experience of finding the right 
date for users. On the other hand, perhaps, in an unintended manner, online classified 
advertisement platforms have led to societal challenges due to spread of illegal 
prostitution activities. The fine line between a legal activity and an illegal activity is 
traversed quite easily due to differential IT-enabled marketplace designs constituting 
online platforms. Therefore, the agencies involved in creating and monitoring online 
platforms should be responsible towards maintaining scrutiny for technologies proper 
societal use. Yet, legal affordances like the section 230 of the communication decency act 
(Ehrlich 2002) shield websites from liability for unlawful advertisement postings made 
by third parties. Consequently, websites like Craigslist and Backpage have become a 
haven for prostitution-related ads.1 
                                                 
1 Recently, newly launched federal policies like Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act 
(SESTA) and Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) are amending section 230 in 
order to take down online websites that facilitate illegal markets, like that of sex 
trafficking. As a result, legal agencies are also actively working towards facilitating 





Next, we look deeper into the market of online prostitution. In this market, the 
clients pay a monetary price for sexual services. Cunningham and Kendall (2011) found 
that online sex workers have characteristics unlike those of traditional sex worker 
stereotypes, for instance, a high proportion of online sex workers have college education 
and hold health insurance, which suggests online sex workers are likely to work 
independently. Further research also found that organized crime rings are using the 
Internet to facilitate prostitution (McAllister 2011, Finn and Stalans 2016). This suggests 
that both independent sex workers and those coerced by organized vice agencies operate 
in online markets. To fight with online prostitution, law enforcement conducts online 
sting operations. Accordingly, the market participants in online prostitution markets need 
to employ discreet and anonymous market clearing setups to avoid arrests, and they need 
to find ways to look out for their own safety before agreeing to take part in a sexual 
service exchange. When considering an online classified platform like Craigslist, its 
unassuming lean website design and discreet IT-features helps maintain anonymity for its 
users in the marketplace. In this backdrop of simplistic IT interface design, sex workers 
can post short unassuming ads, which can make Craigslist unintentionally become the 
haven for sex work. In addition, Craigslist primarily operate as clearing houses for 
regular use products and services. This provides enhanced network effects for the website 
from being a well-known classified advertisement portal, and can bring awareness of an 





Next, we look at the online dating markets, where individuals can search and 
access a vast number of potential mates online who were out of reach in earlier times. 
The online dating websites can facilitate spatial and temporal communication, whereby 
men and women can view each other’s online profiles and send private messages of 
intent. Further online dating website’s recommendation and matching algorithms can sift 
through thousands, or even millions of user profiles, and try to provide matches between 
dating partners. These sophisticated recommendation and matching algorithms take into 
consideration the large number of interpersonal and preferential requirements that users 
inform regarding their personal relationship choices. Therefore, these online dating 
websites are driven to provide a superior relationship than dating offline in order to have 
a business value (Finkel et al., 2012). For instance, PlentyOfFish claims that its members 
send “1 billion messages a month,” and OkCupid claims “We use math to find you 
dates2” (PlentyOfFish.com 2017, OkCupid.com, 2017). These examples establish the 
competitive nature of online dating marketplace where websites are in a constant struggle 
to provide new and useful value to their customer base. Accordingly, these websites are 
continuously toying with a plethora of high-end IT-enabled features, and are continuously 
trying to discover the right mix of features that can make the task of finding a date easier, 
efficient, and superior. In order to do so, online dating websites typically operate using a 
freemium business model, where at the beginning of the membership all users sign up for 
                                                 
2 OkCupid also claims in their website “We work our algorithm magic to find people 





a free account that allows users to access a basic set of IT-enabled features. Users can 
obtain a premium subscription that comes with a fixed bundle of high-end IT-enabled 
features. These high-end features claim to substantially improve the users experience 
towards achieving their dating related goals. Therefore, identifying highly effective IT-
enabled features will add value to both online dating firms and their user base.  
Therefore, in the second essay of this thesis, we look using a microscopic view at the 
impact of an important IT-enabled feature known as the vote-identity revelation feature. 
Accordingly, this study contributes to identify the value of an important IT-enabled 
feature in a two-sided market, where increase in user engagement and matching are of 





Essay 1 - The Digital Sin City: An Empirical Study of 
Craigslist’s Impact on Prostitution Trends 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the Internet is transforming the sex trade. Perer (2012) portrays the 
Internet as a “virtual red-light district” which plays the intermediary role of facilitating 
information flow between sex workers and buyers, making it easier for these individuals 
to strike mutually satisfactory deals, and engage in paid sexual transactions. Even in the 
United States where prostitution and its facilitation are illegal everywhere except Nevada, 
the marketing and arrangement of commercial sex is moving online. In particular, online 
classified advertising sites and underground “entertainment” sites have become the go-to 
avenues to advertise and set up transactions for paid sexual services.  Despite the 
illegality of selling sexual services online, the dated Section 230 of Communications 
Decency Act (CDA) shields websites from liability for unlawful postings made by third 
parties.3 Consequently, the websites like Craigslist have become a haven for prostitution-
related ads.4   
                                                 
3 Further details on Section 230 of the CDA are available at Ehrlich (2002). 
4 A Craigslist blog post revealed that there are at least 700,000 prostitution ads posted on 
the site within a year. See http://blog.craigslist.org/2010/08/18/ manual-screening-





Craigslist is one of the largest online classified service website that offers a 
dedicated section for prostitution ads in the 2000s. Advertisements for sexual services 
were posted under the section “Erotic Services,” which was subsequently renamed as 
“Adults Section” in 2009 after numerous complaints were made against Craigslist. The 
website faces intense public scrutiny over the years, as many believed that the website’s 
operators have knowingly allowed ads that offer paid sexual services to be posted on the 
site. The continuous pressure from a group of state attorneys general finally led to the 
closure of the Adults Section in September 2010. Despite the illegality of selling sexual 
services online, Section 230 of Communication Decency Act (CDA) shields websites, 
such as Craigslist from liability for unlawful postings by third parties, which allowed the 
platform to serve prostitution ads for close to a decade. This brings up a natural question 
on whether amendments should be added in the current CDA such that the 20-year old 
policy does not bear unintended consequences of fostering illegal activities online. 
Although there are anecdotal accounts that link Craigslist to prostitution acts, no studies 
known to date has systematically and formally examined the relationship between the site 
entry and prostitution.  
Past work has examined the textual aspects of the online solicitation ads and 
conducted interview studies with a few selected sex workers, without assessing the 
overall impact that online solicitation sites have on actual prostitution incidence (Castle 
and Lee 2008, Hemmingson 2008). The lack of research on the impact of solicitation 





market that has far reaching social consequences. While a portion of sex workers might 
be made up of willing individuals who needed an income source, the paid sex industry is 
also facilitated by organized vice groups (Cho et al. 2013). Worth $32 billion annually, 
the global sex trade is one of the fastest growing forms of commerce today (Deshpande 
and Nour 2013). Motivated by the lucrative source of monetary profits that prostitution 
provides, organized vice groups engage in sex trafficking to supply the trade with sex 
workers from both developed and under-developed countries (Schauer and Wheaton 
2006, Hanna 2002). Moreover, prostitution is often accompanied by other types of 
crimes, such as drug abuse and drug trade (Hanna 2002). With the introduction of online 
platforms, organized crime groups have begun to make use of this new channel to further 
expand their operations. In light of this pressing issue, this study aims to shed light on 
this phenomenon by investigating the role of online intermediaries and quantify its 
economic impact on prostitution incidence.  
Using a national panel data set, we examine the longitudinal relationship between 
Craigslist’s entry and prostitution trends in 1,796 U.S. counties from 1999 to 2008. To 
empirically identify the entry effects on prostitution incidence, we rely on a natural 
experiment setup inherent in Craigslist’s expansion pattern in the United States. During 
its expansion, Craigslist was launched in different locations in a staggered fashion across 
the years. Thus, in a given year, there is a subset of counties with Craigslist and another 
set of counties that do not. Given that each Craigslist site is location-specific, the 





the location. This unique entry setting allows for the quantitative comparison of ‘treated’ 
counties with ‘control’ counties. Exploiting the natural experiment framework, we run 
difference-in-difference panel regressions of prostitution incidence on Craigslist’s entry 
with county and year fixed effects, and include controls to account for demographic, 
socioeconomic, and crime-related factors that may affect prostitution trends. We further 
perform a series of robustness checks including the use of counties with active 
prostitution cases in our estimation, alternative dependent variables and model 
specifications, various matching schemes to identify comparable treatment and control 
counties, and performing falsification checks to check for spurious results. Additionally, 
we repeat our analyses at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level and utilize 
population-normalized prostitution counts to assess the robustness of the results.  
Our empirical analysis reveals that the entry of Craigslist holds a positive 
relationship with prostitution trends. Site entry is found to result in a 17.58 percentage 
increase in prostitution cases. We find that sign and significance of our main results are 
robust under alternative variable definitions and model specifications. Falsification tests 
indicate that the relationship between site entry and prostitution cases is unlikely to arise 
spuriously, and that a pre-entry trend leading to an increase in prostitution trends was 
absent. We uncover several underlying mechanisms related to the main phenomenon:  
1. The prostitution market facilitated by Craigslist is made up of both independent sex 
workers and workers operating under commercial vice groups, though the latter 





2. Craigslist’s entry increases prostitution in both counties that have existing 
prostitution trends and those that do not, though the former set of counties 
experience a larger growth relative to the latter.  
3. The entry of Craigslist generates spillover effects to neighboring counties without 
Craigslist.  
4. There is an increase in online sex workers who provided exotic sexual services. 
However, this increase is relatively small compared to workers who provided the 
traditional escort services.  
5. Craigslist increases prostitution by inducing more solicitation from existing 
workers, and also by attracting more entrants to the market.  
6. The increase in prostitution arrests happens at a slower rate compared to the 
increase in prostitution.  
7. A complementary effect between erotic and casual sex ads on prostitution trends 
exists. 
 Our paper aims to make a few key contributions. First, our study contributes 
broadly to the emerging literature on the societal challenges associated with online 
intermediaries and Internet penetration (Burtch and Chan 2017, Chan and Ghose 2014, 
Chan et al. 2016, Greenwood and Agarwal 2015). Although the use of the Internet holds 
both positive and negative impacts towards the society, extant work has largely focused 
on examining the former while overlooking the downsides of the Internet. Responding to 





(Fichman et al. 2015, Majchrzak et al. 2012), our investigation of Craigslist’s impact on 
prostitution trends seeks to bring about greater awareness and understanding of the 
vulnerabilities introduced by online technologies, so that proper technological design and 
policy changes can be introduced. While Chan and Ghose (2014) have focused on the 
detrimental impact of online intermediaries on public health, our study has taken the 
route of uncovering the impact of such platforms on prostitution incidence, which 
constitutes as another important social issue. In this sense, our work contributes 
additionally to this literature by providing a broader understanding of the criminal 
impacts of online technologies. 
Second, our findings also add to the literature of platform economics (Rochet and 
Tirole 2003). Extant literature has largely examined the transactional impacts of online 
platforms for markets with lawful normal goods, with few or no studies investigating its 
impact on illegal goods. Given that the high costs of providing and consuming illicit 
services via legal punishment, online prostitution represents a different class of goods 
that bear unique nuances that warrant further examination in relation to platform 
economics. Our study results attempts to enrich this literature by providing first-hand 
empirical evidence towards the phenomenon and uncovering underlying pathways for the 
relationship, helping to pave inroads towards a deeper theoretical understanding of illicit 
markets function under online intermediation. 
Third, by shedding light on the various underlying mechanisms that govern the 





practical contribution of providing actionable, policy-relevant insights needed for the 
effective implementation of strategies and interventions for curbing the proliferation of 
the underground sex trade, with a particular focus of facilitating deeper discussions on 
Section 230 of the CDA. Moreover, the understanding of the various mechanisms of the 
platform-enabled prostitution serves to expose ‘how’, ‘why’, and ‘where’ the sex trade 
would flourish in the Internet era, allowing for a more efficient allocation of law 
enforcement resources.  
2. Study Context and Related Literature 
2.1. Craigslist 
Craigslist started in early 1995, and is the leading online classified service provider in the 
United States in the 2000s. With the launch of the “Erotic Services” section in 2001, 
Craigslist website served as a portal for prostitution advertisements (Farley et al. 2013). 
By 2005, Craigslist had become a virtual prostitution hub, hosting 25,000 new 
prostitution-related ads every ten days in the United States (Farley 2006). A typical 
prostitution ad can either explicitly indicate the provision of sexual services or implicitly 
suggest similar services via sensual massage services. These solicitation ads tend to 
include provocative photographs and provide information such as hourly rates, phone 
numbers, descriptions of worker’s body measurements, and keywords like “busty”, or 
“fantasy girl” (Sandoval 2009). In March 2009, Craigslist was sued for facilitating 
prostitution and that it was a public nuisance (Dart vs. Craigslist, 2009). In response, 





erotic services section, providing links to anti-trafficking websites, and started to charge 
$10 to users who post in the “Adult Service” section (Sarno 2009). Following more 
complaints on Craigslist, seventeen state attorneys general requested the immediate 
removal of the adult services section in August 2010. A month after the request, 
Craigslist voluntarily shut down its adult services section (Lindenberger 2010).  
Despite actions taken to suppress the posting of prostitution ads on Craigslist, 
prostitution ads started to appear in other sections of the site (e.g., personals section) 
(Louie 2010). Furthermore, following Craigslist’s closure of the adult services section, 
other online platforms (e.g., Backpage.com and MyRedBook) assumed the role of 
facilitating online solicitation (Chansanchai 2011). Most of these alternative solicitation 
sites remain active and are not shut down, indicating that the selling of sexual services on 
classified ad sites persist beyond the closure of Craigslist’s adult section. Thus, it remains 
imperative to understand the link between site entry and prostitution, as study findings 
provide insights that would be useful for curbing prostitution trends facilitated by other 
similar online intermediaries.5  
The study of Craigslist’s impact on the prostitution market is also valuable in that 
it sheds light on online platforms in context of illicit goods, a topic that is not well 
understood. Since the early days of ecommerce, most of the IS literature has focused on 
                                                 
5 We chose Craigslist as the site of study as its entry patterns are likely to be exogenous 
which helps to facilitate a cleaner empirical identification as compared to other sites (e.g., 





examining the influence of digital platforms in the context of legal goods. For instance, 
the seminal digital platform paper by Bailey and Bakos (1997) discusses the emerging 
roles of online intermediaries in the retail and automotive industry. Similarly, other works 
have looked at the influence of online platforms on normal goods, such as books and 
newspapers (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Seamans and Zhu 2013). Even recent IS papers 
that examine newer forms of two-sided platforms (e.g., online dating, crowdfunding, 
online labor markets) shied from examining illegal goods (e.g., Bapna et al. 2016, Burtch 
and Chan 2017, Chan and Wang 2017).6 Given that illegal markets bear key differences 
from legal markets, studies rooted in legal goods may not fully illuminate the effect of 
online platforms on the nuanced characteristics of illegal goods. A noteworthy difference 
pertains to the additional costs that market participants for illegal goods face (i.e., 
imprisonment, fines, and evasion costs) which are otherwise not present in the market for 
legal goods (Becker 1974, Bouchard and Wilkins 2013). Moreover, the illicit act of 
buying and selling these goods imply that market participants would not have a formal 
recourse when faced with non-satisfactory transactions (i.e., non-payment, low quality 
services). We discuss the focal study relationship in light of these aspects next.   
                                                 
6 We note that Chan and Ghose (2014) and Cunningham et al. (2017) have looked at 
negative social impacts of Craigslist (i.e., HIV incidence, violence against women). 





2.2 Rational Choice Theory and Online Prostitution  
Based on Becker’s (1974) framework on the economics of crime, the decision to engage 
in a criminal act is a rational process in which individuals make choices that maximizes 
their utility. Accordingly, under the rational choice theory, an individual chooses to 
commit a crime if the total payoffs of the illicit act are higher than its associated costs of 
legal punishment. Similarly, in making a choice to participate in the prostitution market, 
the providers and clients alike would weigh the relative benefits and costs when deciding 
whether to engage in paid sexual transactions. From the perspective of the supply-side, 
the main benefits of participating in this market lie largely in the financial gains.7 From 
the perspective of the demand-side, the incentive to participate in the market is mainly for 
the satiation of sexual desires. Common to providers and clients, the costs of market 
participation involve legal punishment that comes in the form of fines and 
imprisonment.8 Under the shield of the Section 230 of the CDA, site owners do not bear 
                                                 
7 We understand that this can be an over-simplification of the situation faced by service 
providers, as sex workers may not have aligned interests with the agency or the pimps, 
especially in the case of involuntary prostitution. However, this distinction is not crucial 
in this study as we are examining the aggregate prostitution levels induced by the entry of 
Craigslist, which is ultimately driven by financial motives. 
8 Generally speaking, the structure of the laws is set up to punish the leaders and 





any cost for facilitating prostitution, as they are not held responsible for the interactions 
between users. 
With the introduction of an online intermediary, the payoffs and costs faced by 
participants in the prostitution market are subjected to changes that can influence the 
existing prevalence of prostitution. Extant literature on platform economics posits that 
online intermediaries bring about reduced search costs (Bakos 1997, Hann and Terwiesch 
2003), facilitate online communication across spatial and temporal boundaries (Bailey 
and Bakos 1997), and provide a broader base of product offerings (Brynjolfsson et al. 
2003). Similarly, the entry of the Craigslist platform into specific locations is likely to 
increase local incidence of prostitution for the same set of reasons. First, the Craigslist 
platform allows its users to experience various cost reductions of participating in the 
prostitution market. Sex workers soliciting through the platform have lower search costs 
as they need not to ‘walk the streets’ to solicit customers, and clients need not travel to 
red-light districts to search for sexual services. In addition to eliminating search costs, a 
reduction in cost also comes in the form of reduced probability of arrests and detection as 
the sex workers and clients soliciting on Craigslist can work out transactional details 
using online messages and emails (Cunningham and Kendall 2011), thereby reducing 
physical exposure to policing agencies during the solicitation process. Compared to 
seeking prostitutes in red light districts, brothels, or massage parlors, the online search for 
                                                                                                                                                 






prostitutes also preserves the anonymity and privacy of clients (Grewal et al. 2004), 
lowering the perceived risk of legal punishment and detection. Further, given that the 
posting of solicitation ads on Craigslist is free, sex workers would avoid advertising 
cost,9 which is otherwise present when posting ads in traditional medium (e.g., classified 
ads in newspapers).  
Second, sex workers and clients communicating on the online platform can better 
plan sexual transactions with the affordance of Internet technologies. Past research in 
ecommerce has found that well-designed websites are able to facilitate greater purchase 
intentions (Hausman and Siekpe 2009). Online features such as product presentation 
formats (Jiang and Benbasat 2007), product comparison tools (Häubl and Trifts 2000), 
and online product reviews (Zhu and Zhang 2010) that are incorporated in online sites 
can boost online purchase significantly. Similarly in the sales of sexual services, online 
technologies can enhance transaction volume by allowing clients to better assess key 
attributes of sex workers as they are making purchase decisions. For instance, through the 
photos posted on Craigslist ads and emails, clients are able to perceive not only the facial 
attractiveness of workers (e.g. a profile headshot) but also sensitive bodily attributes via 
nude photos, which is otherwise difficult to assess in when soliciting in a public space. At 
the same time, clients are able to compare service attributes across workers listed on 
Craigslist with greater ease, as the transaction information (e.g., price, service duration, 
                                                 
9 Craigslist only started charging a posting fee for escort ads in 2009. The site has 





types of sexual service provided, travel requirements such as in-calls or out-calls) are 
readily available within the ads or email communications (Häubl and Trifts 2000). 
Furthermore, through specialized online review sites (e.g., TheEroticReview.com, 
NaughtyReviews.com, PunterNet.com), clients can cross-check on the service quality of 
the listed workers based on the experiences of other clients (Hughes 2004). Additionally, 
online providers can screen out risky clients before physically meeting them by searching 
client’s name or telephone number from public databases to check if they have past 
records of violence or criminal involvement (Brooks 2009). Thus, the availability of these 
online affordances creates a more efficient matching process, and can heighten the 
prostitution transactions in locations served by Craigslist. 
Third, as an online aggregator, online platforms offer a broader variety of 
products and services compared to the physical stores. Online platforms facilitate the 
long tail phenomenon (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011), by which consumers with specialized 
preferences can discover and locate niche products through online search tools. 
Compared to the traditional prostitution market in which the ethnicity of the sex worker is 
highly dependent on the physical location in where the service is offered (Dank et al. 
2014),10 the workers operating on the Craigslist platform are not limited to a specific 
ethnicity. Further, a consistent motive for why clients seek prostitution services is to 
engage in a different kind of sex that they cannot receive from non-prostitutes, such as 
                                                 
10 For instance, Latina brothels usually house Hispanic sex workers, while massage 





dominance and submission, role playing, and various sexual fetishes (Månsson 2006, 
Monto 2004). Clients could locate these nonconventional services more easily, as online 
platforms host a variety of sex workers by which a broad assortment of paid sexual 
services may be solicited, including niche sexual services. Consequently, this facilitates 
more matches in the market of paid sexual services that is characterized by highly 
heterogeneous preferences.   
2.3 Related Literature on Online Prostitution 
While extant work reports that a majority of street prostitutes are associated with 
organized prostitution rings (Farley et al. 2013, Helfgott 2008), the current literature does 
not provide a clear view of the operating structure of online prostitution enabled by 
platforms. On the one hand, it is plausible that a majority of the solicitation ads are posted 
by willing participants who are not part of organized vice groups, in the attempt to 
capitalize on the financial gains of providing sexual services in this market. Cunningham 
and Kendall (2010) found that online sex workers have characteristics unlike those of 
traditional sex worker stereotypes, for instance, a high proportion having college 
education and holding health insurance. Such worker demography suggests that online 
workers are likely to work independently without pimps and are not coerced into the 
industry by organized prostitution rings. On the other hand, McAllister (2011) noted that 
organized prostitution rings are using the Internet to solicit customers. A recent study 
finds that pimps continued to use platforms such as Craigslist to advertise prostitution 





and Stalans 2016). A likely reason for this trend is that extensive profits can be reaped 
from online solicitation (Dank et al. 2014).11 Given that the lucrativeness of online 
prostitution, organized prostitution rings are motivated to have a foot in its operations.  
Another related issue concerns the geographical growth patterns of online 
prostitution facilitated by online platforms. There is significant academic interest in 
examining whether electronic channels affect the consumption patterns and outcomes 
across locations. For instance, Overby and Forman (2015) find that the presence of an 
online platform reduces frictions in geographically distributed car markets through 
increased price visibility and reduced transaction costs, resulting in an increased 
willingness to travel to further locations to transact. Yet, Lin and Viswanathan (2016) 
document a home bias in the crowdfunding context, with investors favoring home state 
borrowers over external borrowers. The equivocality in past findings suggests that the 
context of interest is likely to have crucial bearings on geographic-related outcomes.  
Due to heterogeneous preferences, clients often value having a variety of 
prostitutes to choose from. Thus, Cunningham and Kendall (2011) reasoned that sex 
workers are incentivized to congregate spatially where clients can find them, and clients 
are also incentivized to travel to places where prostitutes are located. With limited 
enforcement resources, sex workers and pimps would face a lower probability of arrest in 
locations that have a higher concentration of other prostitutes (Freeman et al. 1996). 
                                                 






These arguments jointly suggest that the growth of online prostitution induced by 
Craigslist would be larger in locations with existing prostitution trends, compared to 
locations without existing prostitution activity. Moreover, the impact of Craigslist may 
also indirectly affect prostitution trends in neighboring locations that are not served by 
Craigslist. Pimps and sex workers tend to travel to other locations to seek additional 
business (Scambler 2007), and would likely respond to close-by client requests, leading 
to spillover effects in these neighboring areas. 
Users could solicit sexual acts through different ad sections on Craigslist. On top 
of the “Erotic service” ads listings, users can also search under the “Personals ads” 
section to look for non-paid casual hookups among other sex-seeking users. Broadly 
speaking, the “Erotic service” ads and “Personals ads” can be deemed as facilitating 
market and nonmarket sexual transactions, respectively (Chan and Ghose 2014). While 
both market and nonmarket transactions fulfill sexual desires, the motivations to engage 
in paid sex and casual hookups may not always overlap. Strokoff et al. (2014) find that 
individuals hookup because they anticipate that a potential relationship to emerge from 
their encounter. Prevailing social norms indicated by the prevalence of peers with hookup 
experience can also lead to desires for hooking up (Fielder and Carey 2009). On the other 
hand, the motives of clients who opt to pay for sex include satisfying the dirty whore 
fantasy, wanting a different kind of sex from what they can receive from non-prostitutes, 
and seeking a subservient woman for domination (Milrod and Monto 2012). Given 





different needs on top of satiating sexual urges. Recently, qualitative studies have 
reported instances where the clients are emphasizing deeper and more emotionally 
rewarding relationships with providers, a phenomenon termed as “The Girlfriend 
Experience” (Milrod and Monto 2012). Thus, the use of “Personals” and “Erotic service” 
ads may have a positive, complimentary effect on prostitution trends.    
3. Data 
To investigate the impact of Craigslist on prostitution, we constructed a nationwide panel 
data that consists of Craigslist entry patterns and prostitution incidence at the county-year 
level between 1999 and 2008. In constructing this panel data, we rely on four main data 
sources, namely TheEroticReview.com (TER), FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting 
System (NIBRS) database, Craigslist website, and the Census Bureau.12 Our main 
dependent variable is Prostitutioniy, which is a measure of the number of indoor 
prostitutes in county i for year y. We proxy for prostitution incidence using the count of 
sex workers with user reviews on TER. Launched in 1998, TER is one of the largest 
female escort review site, receiving between 500,000 and 1,000,000 unique visitors 
monthly (Richtel, 2008). The process for submitting a review on TER is highly detailed 
                                                 
12 As of July 2009, United States has 3,143 counties or county equivalents 
(http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usainfo.shtml). To avoid issues from selective reporting, 
counties with sparse observations (i.e., more than one year of missing data) are dropped 
from the analysis. Main results are largely similar when these observations are included. 





and it requires contributing users to provide several pieces of information about the 
worker (e.g., physical attributes, prices, service provided, and worker rating).13 Reviews 
submitted to the site only become available after several days, as all reviews are routinely 
checked by TER staff.14 Using a web scraping script, we collected data on 64,270 escort 
profiles that had at least one review on TER between 1999 and 2008. Figure A1 reports 
the distribution of escort profiles based on review counts.  
The core advantage for utilizing TER review data as a proxy of prostitution count 
is that user reviews mirror actual experiences that clients have with sex workers, allowing 
us to capture sex workers who are active in online solicitation. Issues of fraudulent 
reviews are less of a concern in our context for two reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, 
the review data was thoroughly vetted by the staff to ensure that every entry of new 
                                                 
13 In submitting a review, TER mandates its users to list the internet contact of the 
prostitute, for instance, an advertisement on a public classified ads site like Craigslist, a 
personal website, email (if available), and a telephone number. In addition, reviewers are 
asked to provide a detailed free-form narrative of their meeting with their encounter with 
the provider. 
14 Not only do the staff verify that the provided details correspond to the information 
from the online ads and sites, they also match new incoming reviews with existing 
workers with reviews by telephone number, website URL, and email address, to 
minimize duplicate entries for the same worker. The fact that many workers have 





workers are traceable to an online contact, reducing the possibility that a reviewed escort 
is made up. Moreover, there is no motivation to generate reviews for an escort that does 
not exist. Second, falsified escort information or reviews do not jeopardize the integrity 
of the outcome variable, as the main goal of the outcome measure is to capture the count 
of prostitutes operating in each location and not the quality of these workers. On the 
contrary, the motives to generate fake reviews (i.e., to enhance business opportunities) 
are actually helpful in revealing prostitutes who are active in soliciting clients. 
Regardless, our measure of online reviews falls short in capturing prostitutes who 
solicited via Craigslist but were not mentioned in the reviews, as a result of clients who 
have low willingness to write online reviews of their sexual experiences. Because our 
dependent variable misses out on capturing sex workers that are linked with Craigslist 
entry but are not reviewed on TER, the estimated entry effect in our regression analyses 
would likely be an underestimate of the actual entry effect. 
In using the TER data, we further refine the coding of our dependent variable by 
considering four different definitions. Our first measure, TER: All Years, simply assumes 
that the escorts remain active for all years beginning from the year she receives her first 
review. In our second measure, we factor for the possibility that prostitutes may exit the 
industry after some time. Accordingly, we consider a sex worker to be active for the 





Years.15 Further, given that it is possible that not every escort on TER solicits via 
Craigslist, we further derive subsets of escorts for the two measures above for prostitutes 
who have clients who solicited their services via Craigslist. We identify such workers by 
searching for escorts who have the terms ‘Craigslist,’ ‘CL,’ or ‘Craigs’ mentioned in their 
reviews. We also consider the measure of number of TER reviews, which proxies for the 
number of solicitation transactions to supplement to our prostitution count measure, since 
each sex worker can engage in multiple acts of prostitution.16 
As an alternative measure of prostitution incidence, we look towards offline 
policing data from the NIBRS, with which we tabulate the number of arrests made on 
indoor female prostitutes. The NIBRS data is available under FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Report (UCR) program, a nationwide, cooperative statistical effort that involves close to 
18,000 city, university and college, county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement 
agencies in reporting crime-related information. Given the consistency in crime reporting 
standards established over the years across enforcement agencies, crimes reported in the 
NIBRS are of high levels of accuracy and reliability. Further, the NIBRS reports specific 
details regarding the crime, including the location in which arrest was made. We rely on 
                                                 
15 For a sex worker with only one review, she is coded to be active for that particular year 
only. 
16 That said, we note that the number of reviews can only serve as proxy for the incidence 






the arrest location to differentiate the indoor workers from the street workers. 
Specifically, indoor prostitutes are coded as such if they are either arrested in a 
hotel/motel or in a residence. 
Our main independent variable is Craigslist Entryiy, which is a binary variable 
that indicates whether Craigslist is present in county i in year y. This variable is 
constructed using information from the Craigslist website, which specifies the locations 
and years in which new sites are launched.17 By combining the TER prostitution data 
with the Craigslist entry information, we are able to contrast pre-entry prostitution figures 
with post-entry prostitution trends. To account for potential confounding factors that 
influence prostitution and Craigslist entry in each county, we include demographic, 
socioeconomic, and crime-related factors as control variables. The U.S. Census Bureau 
provides county level information on age-group proportions, ethnicity proportions, 
population size, poverty, employment proportions, and average income levels. FBI’s 
databases provide county level information on various crime trends for each year, and 
annual number of police employees. 
Given that the proportion of sexually active individuals can influence the demand 
and supply of sexual services, we created the controls for population proportion of age 
groups 15-19, 20-39, and 40-59, for each county. We also control for the proportion of 
White, African American, and Asian as these are major ethnic groups having reported 
representation in the prostitution market (Hughes 2005). We further include population 
                                                 





size, as a covariate to account for potential increase in demand and supply of sexual 
services due to availability of potential participants in each location. The lack of 
employment, low incomes, and poverty levels can steer individuals towards prostitution 
(Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld 1938, Monroe 2005). To control for these economic factors, 
we added the proportion of employed individuals, average annual income, and poverty 
level as covariates in our model. Finally, the usage of other hookup and dating sites are 
likely to grow with increasing internet penetration. Also, the prevalence of TER reviews 
could differ across locations due to differences in internet penetration. To reduce 
extraneous effects arising from varying levels of internet access, we controlling for the 
availability of broadband providers using data furnished by the Federal Communications 
Commission. 
We also consider criminology factors that may influence prostitution. We control 
for number of police employee as the size of the police force is a deterrent against 
prostitution activities (Weitzer 1999). The FBI database Law Enforcement Officers Killed 
and Assaulted (LEOKA) provides information on the annual number of police employees 
at each county. Further, extant work has found that non-financial incentives of joining the 
online sex industry include the need to feel different, to be validated, to be in control, and 
it is also an alternative to self-harming (Jonsson et al. 2015). These reasons are 
inextricably related to adverse life experiences and domestic violence. Criminology 
studies note that organized vice rings have intentionally hook girls on drugs and forced 





these factors by controlling for the prevalence of runaways, drug-related crimes, and 
offenses made against family and children, using data from the FBI. In addition, we 
extracted the count of commercialized vice, larceny, arson, and burglary for various 
auxiliary tests. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Craigslist Entry 16735 0.071 0.258 0 1 
Log (TER: All Years) 16735 0.141 0.616 0 7.662 
Log (TER: Active Years) 16735 0.105 0.499 0 6.4 
Log (TER: All Years, Using Craigslist) 16735 0.036 0.263 0 4.997 
Log (TER: Active Years, Using Craigslist) 16735 0.032 0.235 0 4.344 
Log (TER: Reviews, Using Craigslist) 16735 0.054 0.392 0 5.889 
Log (FBI Indoor Prostitution) 16735 0.047 0.301 0 5.187 
Log (Commercial Vice Crimes) 16735 0.111 0.707 0 7.912 
Log (Larceny) 16735 2.866 1.886 0 9.324 
Log (Arson) 16735 0.457 0.747 0 6.133 
Log (Burglary) 16735 2.117 1.474 0 7.984 
Age 15-19 Proportion 16735 0.074 0.013 0.022 0.25 
Age 20-39 Proportion 16735 0.236 0.044 0.109 0.496 
Age 40-59 Proportion 16735 0.28 0.029 0.103 0.48 
White Proportion 16735 0.897 0.156 0.03 1 
African American Proportion 16735 0.075 0.14 0 0.867 
Asian Proportion 16735 0.007 0.017 0 0.639 
Log (Population Size) 16735 9.714 1.224 4.007 14.656 
Log (Poverty) 16735 7.671 1.223 0 12.923 
Employed Proportion 16735 0.947 0.021 0.697 0.99 
Log (Annual Mean Income) 16735 10.486 0.244 0 11.566 
Log (Broadband Penetration) 16735 1.446 0.393 0 3.068 
Log (Police Officers) 16735 3.331 1.245 0 8.851 
Log (Offense Against Family and Children) 16735 1.384 1.415 0 7.559 
Log (Runaway Individuals) 16735 0.968 1.33 0 7.445 
Log (Drug-Related Crimes) 16735 3.388 1.865 0 9.544 
Note. All logged variables are of the format of log (X+1). 
4. Empirical Methodology 
During the 2000s, Craigslist expanded to different locations in the United States in a 
staggered fashion, making its site available to a few cities at a time. Because Craigslist 





locations since only the local populations are able to access to the services of the escort 
ads posted on the site. In the same fashion, counties that do not have Craigslist in the 
same period serve as ‘control’ location. Thus, the phased expansion of Craigslist in the 
United States represents a natural experiment that allows for the comparison of the 
difference in prostitution incidence for counties with Craigslist before and after site entry 
to the same difference for counties that did not experience site entry. We exploit the 
variation in Craigslist’s entry across counties and years in the natural experiment setup to 
identify entry effects on prostitution trends.  In particular, we estimate a difference-in-
difference regression of the form: 
,        (1)                        
where i indicates counties and y refer to year, y = 1999, … , 2008;  is the 
number of prostitutes for county i in year y;  is a vector of 1,796 county fixed effects; 
 is a vector of year fixed effects;  is a vector of county-year covariates including 
demographic, socioeconomic, and crime-related factors (i.e., age proportion, racial 
proportion, population size, employment proportion, income level, poverty level, 
broadband providers, number of police employees, and various crime trends); 
 is the binary indicator for Craigslist entry, which equals to 1 if the county 
has Craigslist in a particular year, and equals zero otherwise; and  is  error term.  
In the above specification, the coefficient p is the difference-in-difference 
estimate of the effect of Craigslist’s entry on the incidence of prostitution. If p > 0, then 





control for time-invariant geographical differences, while year fixed effects control for 
temporal macroeconomic shocks, which allows for the comparison of prostitution counts 
between counties over time. To account for serial correlation in the data, we clustered the 
error terms at the county level (Bertrand et al. 2004). Finally, we tackle heteroscedasticity 
in population size by weighting our regressions by population size. In our estimations, we 
use various alternative definitions of indoor prostitutions based on online and offline data 
sources to see if results would differ qualitatively. Furthermore, given that a single 
Craigslist entry may sometimes span multiple counties, we check whether the results are 
stable when the regressions are performed at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
unit of analysis. 
5. Results 
5.1 Main Analysis 
Table 2 presents the main results for our empirical analysis. First, we show the population 
weighted OLS regressions in Model 1 using the broadest definition of prostitution 
incidence, TER: All Years. We see that the binary entry variable yields a positive and 
significant coefficient. This estimate represents a 47.69 percentage increase in 
prostitution trends due to Craigslist’s entry. We repeat this analysis under a MSA unit of 
analysis and find that the Craigslist entry variable remains positive and significant. In 
Models 3 and 4, we report the estimation results using a stricter definition of prostitution 
count, TER: Active Years, wherein sex workers are assumed to be active for the years 





prostitution incidence, the site entry coefficients remain positively significant but are of a 
reduced magnitude. In particular, the effect size of the entry variable reflects a 26.61 
percentage increase in prostitution incidence (Model 3).  
Next, we further tighten our definition of prostitution incidence by considering 
only sex workers who have solicited clients on Craigslist. We repeat our previous 
analyses in Models 5 to 8. We continue to find a positive and significant coefficient for 
the Craigslist entry variables in these models. In our most conservative definition of 
prostitution count (Model 7), site entry leads to a 17.58 percent increase in prostitution 
incidence, representing a smaller effect than its counterpart in Model 3.18  Finally, we 
assess if the results remain qualitatively similar under an offline proxy for prostitution 
count via police arrests. We find that the entry estimates in Models 9 and 10 remain 
positive and significant, suggesting that the entry effects observed under TER data are not 
                                                 
18 Using the serial correlation check in Bertrand et al. (2004), we replicated our model 
1000 times with randomly assigned pseudo treatments for our strictest model (Model 7). 
We find that only 6.2% of these models had significant coefficients for the pseudo 
Craigslist entry when clustered standard errors is used. This number is close to the 
conventional standard of 5% level of significance which is used to distinguish true results 
from those that arise by chance. The result of this check indicates that clustered standard 





simply driven by increasing reviewing activity on TER over time.19 As expected, the 
effect size of Craigslist entry in Model 9 is smaller than those derived under TER data, 
due to the fact that prostitution cases can go undetected by enforcement agents.  
An examination of the coefficients on the covariates reveals some meaningful 
relationships between socioeconomic factors and prostitution trends. As expected, the 
regressions show that prostitution increases with population size, poverty levels and 
broadband penetration, and decreases with employment proportions and average income 
levels. However, it is surprising to see the number of police officers does not hold a 
significant relationship with prostitution count. The number of policing resources 
assigned to a location can be a consequence of crime intensity and can also act as a 
deterrent to future crime rates. The opposing effects embodied by this variable may 
cancel each other out, leading to an overall zero effect. Finally, we notice that the number 
of drug-related arrests is negatively correlated with prostitution incidence under the TER 
data but is positively related with prostitution arrests from the FBI dataset. This 
inconsistency might be an artifact of the different datasets utilized. A planned crack-
down on drug syndicates may lead to the detection of underlying prostitution activities, 
resulting in a positive correlation between the frequency of drug-related arrests and 
prostitution arrests in the FBI data.   
                                                 
19 In a separate analysis, we further tracked the annual change in review count for each 
sex worker on TER over the study period. We find that the annual average number of 





Table 2: Main Results on the Impact of Craigslist Entry on Prostitution Levels 
 TER: All Years TER: Active Years 
TER: All Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
TER: Active Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
FBI Indoor  
Prostitution Arrests 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Craigslist Entry 
0.390*** 0.696*** 0.236*** 0.457*** 0.199*** 0.334*** 0.162*** 0.287*** 0.047*** 0.105*** 
(0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
Age 15-19 Proportion 
9.834*** 4.609 6.712*** 3.205 6.832*** 8.675* 5.869*** 8.343* 0.745* -7.499*** 
(1.49) (6.35) (1.12) (5.28) (1.17) (4.92) (1.02) (4.55) (0.40) (2.72) 
Age 20-39 Proportion 
1.310* -0.145 1.054* 0.486 1.005** 2.325 0.847** 2.128 -0.339 -4.228*** 
(0.78) (2.65) (0.60) (2.19) (0.47) (2.17) (0.40) (2.03) (0.22) (0.98) 
Age 40-59 Proportion 
1.467* 2.829 1.221** 2.486 1.457*** 3.999 1.272*** 3.899* -0.228 -2.686* 
(0.82) (3.13) (0.61) (2.69) (0.50) (2.51) (0.43) (2.35) (0.19) (1.42) 
White Proportion 
-6.695*** -0.005 -4.951*** -1.696 -4.476*** -5.190 -3.939*** -5.640 -1.201** 2.643 
(2.22) (7.04) (1.65) (5.13) (1.41) (4.32) (1.23) (3.64) (0.48) (3.22) 
African American Proportion 
-2.353 6.177 -1.843 3.544 -2.122 -1.310 -1.872 -2.377 -0.299 6.396** 
(2.12) (6.83) (1.57) (4.81) (1.31) (4.11) (1.14) (3.44) (0.43) (3.08) 
Asian Proportion 
4.585 3.820 2.874 0.199 2.094 -1.878 1.577 -2.536 1.034 2.062 
(5.30) (7.76) (4.01) (4.90) (3.52) (4.35) (3.11) (3.57) (0.94) (2.25) 
Log (Population Size) 
1.057*** 0.412*** 0.710*** 0.328** 0.434*** 0.117 0.373*** 0.119 0.110** 0.270*** 
(0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) 
Log (Poverty) 
0.223*** -0.026 0.138*** -0.057 0.046 -0.031 0.033 -0.049 0.046* 0.090 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) 
Employed Proportion 
-1.324*** -6.758*** -1.115*** -6.261*** -0.935*** -4.214*** -0.847*** -4.096*** -0.184 0.183 
(0.48) (1.98) (0.38) (1.65) (0.28) (1.47) (0.25) (1.33) (0.15) (0.71) 
Log (Annual Income) 
-0.138** -0.047 -0.091** -0.027 -0.022 0.024 -0.018 0.028 -0.040 -0.108 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) 
Log (Broadband Penetration)  
0.310*** 0.850*** 0.249*** 0.716*** -0.002 0.130* 0.007 0.131* 0.003 0.056 
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) 
Log (Police Officers) 
-0.018 0.091 -0.016 0.076 -0.023 0.062 -0.020 0.046 -0.007 0.005 
(0.03) (0.12) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) 
Log (Offense Against Family  
and Children) 
0.000 0.022 -0.001 0.016 0.001 0.018 0.001 0.015 0.001 -0.009 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log (Runaway Individuals) 
0.001 0.017 0.003 0.017 -0.002 0.008 -0.001 0.010 0.001 0.002 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log (Drug-Related Crimes) 
0.001 -0.073** -0.002 -0.070** 0.001 -0.031** 0.000 -0.032** 0.012** 0.047** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Unit of Analysis County MSA County MSA County MSA County MSA County MSA
R-squared 0.260 0.443 0.186 0.349 0.127 0.269 0.139 0.247 0.028 0.201 
F-Stats 14.027 11.053 9.249 6.935 5.847 4.461 5.057 3.830 2.246 2.629 
Observations 16735 4898 16735 4898 16735 4898 16735 4898 16735 4898 
Note. The dependent variables for Models 1-8 are the log number of TER prostitution cases under various definitions. The dependent variables for Models 9 & 
10 are log number of FBI indoor female prostitution arrests cases. Robust standard errors clustered by counties are reported in parentheses below coefficient 





5.2 Robustness Checks 
We further scrutinize the main results under a set of robustness checks. Taking a 
conservative stance, we adopt counts of sex workers who are known to solicit on 
Craigslist for all our subsequent analyses. Results for the robustness checks are reported 
in Models 2 to 6 of Table A2. We replicate the respective estimates from the main model 
in Model 1 for comparison purposes. First, we rerun the main specification using un-
weighted regressions to examine whether the main effect persist without population 
weights. In Model 2, we find that the Craigslist entry variable continues to have positive 
and significant coefficients under the un-weighted specification. Second, to abstract from 
scaling issues, we run the analysis using prostitution counts that are normalized by 
population size.20 We report estimates for this regression in Model 3. Third, to allow for a 
more comparable set of counties to be used in our difference-in-difference analysis, we 
restrict our analysis to a sample of counties which have at least one count of prostitution 
taking place during the study period. We report this result in Model 4. Fourth, we include 
time-varying county-specific controls in our main specification to account for the 
possibility of location-specific time trends, and report this result in Model 5. The site 
entry estimates in these models continue to be positive and significant. Fifth, we rely on 
review counts to supplement the number of profiles as an alternative dependent variable, 
as it proxies for the incidence of prostitution activity. As seen in Model 6, the regression 
                                                 
20 Specifically, our dependent variable is normalized as follows: . 
The resultant coefficient gives the percentage increase in sex workers per 10,000 people 





shows that Craigslist entry leads to an increase of 29.69% in prostitution activity, as 
measured by review count. 
Sixth, we conduct our analysis on a county-month level to see if the results hold at 
a finer unit of analysis. Our results for this analysis are reported in Table 3. For this 
analysis, we applied a “regression discontinuity” modeling approach, and aggregated the 
observations into two periods: before and after site entry (Manchanda et al. 2015). The 
approach compares log of total prostitution counts before website entry with that after 
site entry. Further, we consider consecutively longer temporal windows on both sides of 
the site entry treatment, to which the entry month is left out as the reference point. The 
temporal windows range from one month to seven months in length, as we look for the 
starting month for the site entry effect to start showing. When we compare the 
coefficients from Model 1-7, we find that as the time-duration of the windows get longer, 
the magnitude of Craigslist impact seems to increase. Further, the result reveals that the 
impact of Craigslist tends to start from the fifth month after Craigslist’s launch (Model 5 
of Table 3). 
Table 3: Analysis of Craigslist’s Impact using Monthly Data 
Variable 


























Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Craigslist 
Entry 
0.004 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.029** 0.040*** 0.052*** 
Note. Dependent variable is TER: Active Years (Using Craigslist). Months are coded as 0 
for pre-entry and 1 for the post-entry. Models 1 through 7 report results under different 
window lengths. Robust standard errors clustered by counties are used. * p < 0.10, ** p < 





Seventh, we also rely on various matching estimation techniques to arrive at a set 
of treated and control counties that are statistically similar in terms of the demographic, 
socioeconomic and crime indicators to see if the main results continue to hold. All 
control variables are used in the matching procedure. In our matching, we have restricted 
the analysis to observations that have common support.21 We first report the covariate 
balance checks under the one-to-one matching scheme without replacement (Table A3). 
All covariates had a reduction in bias, and majority of matched covariates show a 
reduction in bias by over eighty percent.22 Further, the two-sample t-test for equal means 
suggests that the means are statistically similar for all covariates between treated and 
control groups after matching. We attempted various matching schemes including k-
nearest neighbor, kernel matching, and coarsened exact matching.23 While many of our 
estimates in Table A5 are of a smaller magnitude than the baseline estimates in Table 2, 
the matched estimates remain positive and significant, indicating that the observed entry 
effect on prostitution is not driven by peculiar local characteristics in certain locations. 
Finally, we account for the possibility of duplicate TER profiles by assessing the 
change in effect size when TER profiles with different review count cutoffs are 
                                                 
21 A plot of the propensity score distribution (Figure A2) shows that there is a good 
amount of overlap between the treated and control unit, thereby satisfying the common 
support assumption. 
22 Table A4 provides the coefficient estimates for the covariates that predicted site entry 
in the matching scheme.   
23 We utilized different choices for nearest neighbor, i.e. 1, 2, 3, or 4 neighbors, and our 





considered. Sex workers might abandon an existing profile and start a new profile if the 
existing one has received bad reviews. Such an act is more likely to take place when the 
existing profile only has few reviews, as it is more costly for a worker to abandon a 
profile that has accumulated multiple reviews. We conduct regressions using dependent 
variables with different review count cutoffs, under the assumption that profiles with a 
greater number of reviews are more likely to represent actual, active sex workers. The 
coefficient sizes of each of these models and that for the original baseline model are 
plotted in Figure A3. We find that the effect size generally drops as the cutoff value 
increases. However, we find that the coefficient stabilizes at around 10% for sex workers 
who have 6 or more reviews. Given that the effect does not disappear with stricter 
definitions of an “active” worker profile, the observed positive entry effect on 
prostitution is deemed to be robust against the possibility of duplicate profiles. 
5.3 Entry Exogeneity 
In order for the results above to be valid, the entry of Craigslist needs to be exogenous 
with respect to prostitution trends. Several aspects of Craigslist’s operation suggest that 
its entry decisions are uncorrelated to the local prostitution trends. First, Craigslist did not 
charge its users for posting and accessing prostitution ads prior to 2009, the point when 
they received public complaints. The site relied on fees from job postings and New York 
City apartment listings to offset its operational costs. Thus, Craigslist did not have a 
profit motive to launch in locations with existing prostitution trends, as it does not receive 
any financial gains from ads posted in the erotic/adults service section (Stannard 2008).  
Second, as a classified advertisement portal, Craigslist hosts multiple ad sections 





location is unlikely to be driven solely by the local demand for online solicitation. 
However, it is plausible that the growth of cities may indirectly lead to a simultaneous 
increase in both prostitution demand and user requests for Craigslist service. We address 
for this possibility by controlling for a wide variety of socioeconomic factors that capture 
the economic characteristics of each location in our main regressions above. In addition, 
we empirically assess whether the entry of Craigslist is predicted by the prevailing 
volume of prostitution activity in each county. To do so, we regress Craigslist entry on 
the existing prevalence of prostitution, along with the same set of demographic, 
socioeconomic, and crime-related factors used in the main analysis. The dependent 
variable, Craigslist entry, is made up of a string of zeros and is terminated with the value 
of one in the first year of entry in each county. Subsequent years after site entry are not 
included in the regression analysis as the goal here is to identify whether existing 
prostitution levels correlate with entry patterns. We used three different measures of 
prostitution levels in our analysis. The first two measures are the number of prostitutes 
who used Craigslist for solicitation under the definitions of TER: All Years and TER: 
Active Years, as described earlier. We also rely on the number of commercial vice crimes 
as a third measure of prostitution activity, because organized prostitution rings may 
influence the entry of Craigslist into counties that were deemed to be appropriate 
locations for supporting their prostitution business. The results of this analysis showed 
that all three measures of prostitution levels do not correlate with entry patterns of 
Craigslist (Table A6), suggesting that the exogeneity assumption is reasonable.  
Third, the staggered pattern of site entry in various United States locations 





entry patterns of alternative prostitution sites, our difference-in-difference coefficient 
would be picking up site entry effects that pertain strictly to Craigslist. Furthermore, we 
rely on counts of prostitutes known to solicit on Craigslist to reduce concerns of the entry 
variable picking up effects from other prostitution sites. Moreover, many of these 
solicitation sites charged users a fee for posting and/or accessing the escort ads, which led 
to lower web traffic for these sites. Thus, Craigslist, being one of the first online 
platforms that facilitate sexual solicitation, dominated the online prostitution market in 
the early and mid-2000s.24 While the presence of alternative prostitution sites may 
potentially adds noise to the estimates, the relatively small traffic volume with respect to 
Craigslist’s site visits is unlikely to distort the overall impact of Craigslist’s entry on 
prostitution trends. Regardless, we perform additional empirical checks to assess whether 
these alternative sites would confound our estimated entry effect. Our test involves 
adding the entry times and web traffic of alternative sites as covariates, and assessing 
whether that affect the main results.  
We consider two scenarios in which alternative platforms could potentially affect 
the impact of Craigslist on the online prostitution market. First, competing sites may 
enter different locations in a staggered fashion similar to Craigslist’s entry style. Entry 
patterns of the alternative site may be correlated to the entry patterns of Craigslist as 
these sites face similar operation considerations. To our knowledge, Backpage is the only 
                                                 
24 From Google search data, we see that the search traffic for Backpage and Eros (the two 
most popular adult sites after Craigslist), were approximately 1/45 and 1/15 of 
Craigslist’s search volumes between year 2004 and 2008, respectively (Accessed on 





other classified ad site that also operated during the study period, and had hosted 
prostitution ads. The second scenario involves solicitation sites that made its service 
simultaneously available to all locations via a single entry time. While the time fixed 
effects in our baseline model should take care of the impact of such solicitation sites, we 
devised a separate empirical test involving site traffic data to rule out any further 
concerns related to such sites. In particular, we consider Eros.com, the largest solicitation 
site that was made available to all location via a single launch date. Results of the two 
conducted tests are presented in Table 4. Both location and year fixed effects are used in 
these analyses. Collectively, these two tests provided additional confidence that the 
presence of alternative solicitation sites do not distort the main results. 
Table 4: Accounting for Alternative Prostitution Sites 
 
Main Model 
Controlling for  
Backpage Entry 
Controlling for  
Eros Entry 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Craigslist Entry 
0.162*** 0.111***   
(0.03) (0.02)   
‘Craigslist’ search term 
  0.005***  
  (0.00)  
‘Eros’ search term 
  -0.001  
  (0.00)  
Log (‘Craigslist’ search term) 
   0.049* 
   (0.03) 
Log (‘Eros’ search term) 
   -0.040 
   (0.03) 
R-squared 0.139 0.207 0.192 0.181 
F-Stats 5.057 5.349 6.997 6.448 
Observations 16735 16735 2210 2210 
Notes. We collected data on Backpage entry by scraping Backpage sites of various 
counties, and noting the first year in which ads became available. We include Backpage’s 
entry as a control in our baseline model. Model 1 reports Craigslist coefficient that was 
mentioned in Model 7 of Table 2. Model 2 reports coefficient for Craigslist entry after 
controlling for Backpage entry. Given that Eros entered all locations at the same time, we 
contrast the impact of search traffic from both sites over time on our outcome variable. 
Search traffic can serve as a good approximation for the average site visit count and 
usage level for the solicitation sites. We collected search trend data from Google Trends 
based on the keywords ‘craigslist’ and ‘eros’ for the years 2004 to 2008. Search volumes 
of keywords are available from 2004 onwards, allowing for analysis to cover the 2004-
2008 period. These search volumes are available by the MSA-month level. The 





active years and using Craigslist. The same set of control covariates, and location and 
time fixed effects from Table 2 are used in all models. Robust standard errors clustered 
by location are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
5.4 Falsification Results 
To assess the possibility of the entry variable picking up significant effects spuriously, we 
perform two falsification tests.  First, we repeat our analysis using alternative crimes that are 
unlikely to bear any relationship with the entry of Craigslist and/or prostitution trends, as 
dependent variables. Specifically, we choose larceny, arson and burglary as alternative 
dependent variables because these crimes tend to occur spontaneously and/or are unlikely to be 
mediated through Craigslist sites. Under this falsification check, we expect the site entry 
coefficients not to pick up any effect on these crimes in these regressions. A significant estimate 
on the Craigslist variable in these tests suggests the presence of spurious correlation in our main 
analyses. Results of the falsification tests are depicted in Table A7. It is observed that binary 
entry variable do not hold statistically significant relationships with the incidence of larceny, 
arson, or burglary, providing supporting evidence that the entry effect on prostitution levels did 
not arise spuriously.  
Second, the relationship between Craigslist’s entry and prostitution incidence may be 
driven by unobserved factors that are confounded with prostitution trends. For instance, changes 
in the macro-economic conditions or the expansion of prostitution rings in certain locations can 
increase the prevailing local prostitution trends, which can subsequently lead to requests for 
Craigslist launches in these areas to facilitate solicitation. Under such a possibility, prostitution 
incidence may already be increasing due to these alternative reasons, and would continue to 
increase even without the presence of Craigslist. In these cases, the entry variable is merely 
picking up these pre-existing effects caused by confounding factors. We assess the possibility of 





indicators as placeboes, along with four years of post-entry indicators to capture the inter-
temporal entry effects as follows: 
,               (2)  
where  and year y is the jth year since Craigslist’s entry 
in county i. In the presence of a pre-entry effect, the placebo indicators would produce 
positively significant coefficients. In addition, the coefficients of the post-entry indicators 
reflect the change in effect sizes over time. We conduct this check using the stricter 
definition of prostitution incidence, i.e., TER: Active Years (Using Craigslist).25 Results 
of this falsification tests is reported in Figure 1.26 Across all models, we observe that the 
three year pre-entry placebo variables do not hold significant coefficients, suggesting that 
the parallel trends assumption is fulfilled and that the observed relationship between 
prostitution levels and Craigslist entry is unlikely to arise as an artifact from events that 
occur in periods prior to Craigslist’s entry. The result of the time falsification check also 
lends support to the exogeneity assumption by showing that site entry is not correlated 
with pre-existing increases in prostitution levels. The entry indicators are positively 
significant for post entry periods and are increasing with time. In particular, the entry 
                                                 
25 Alternative prostitution definitions provided qualitatively similar estimates. 
26 Figure 1 reports three pre-entry and four post-entry years. In addition to this 
specification, we also tried other models involving different number of leads and lags. 
Results consistently show that the pre-entry effects are not present and that significant 
estimates are only present in the post-entry periods. Results of these additional checks are 






effects exhibit a non-linear impact on the prostitution growth, corresponding to an 
increase of over 200 percentage point in the fourth year of entry.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Impact of Pre- and Post- Entry Craigslist Indicators  
(95% confidence level) 
Note: The more conservative definition of prostitution incidence is used in the derivation 
of this graph. That is, TER: Active Years (Using Craigslist). The alternative definition, 
TER: All Years (Using Craigslist) produces a similar graph. 
 
6. Potential Mechanisms and Related Trends 
From the analyses thus far, results suggest that the entry of Craigslist has an effect of 
increasing the prostitution incidence of locations that it enters. However, it is less clear 
what underlying mechanisms are driving this relationship. Here, we perform five 
analyses to shed light on some related mechanisms. 
6.1 Relationship with Commercial Vice 
It is important for policy makers and enforcement agencies to understand whether the 
Craigslist-enabled prostitution is operated mainly by organized vice groups or by 





different. To address this dichotomy in possibilities, we assess and compare the 
Craigslist’s impact on prostitution across locations with varying levels of organized 
prostitution activity. To do so, we regress prostitution count on commercial vice activity, 
Craigslist’s entry, and their interaction, along with the same set of controls and fixed 
effects in our main models. In this regression, the coefficient of Craigslist entry indicates 
the effect of site entry on prostitution, in locations where organized vice activities are low 
or absent. As the commercial vice variable captures the prostitution levels in areas 
operated by commercial vice groups, the Craigslist entry variable now measures the 
market size of sex workers who are likely to operate independently from the organized 
rings. The interaction term indicates the increase in prostitution that occurs in areas with 
Craigslist presence and high commercial vice activity.27 Since not all commercial 
prostitution activities are detected by enforcement agencies, the volume of these 
organized crimes may not be precisely documented by the FBI. To alleviate this concern, 
we conduct a robustness check in which we adopted an alternative definition for 
commercial vice. In this check, we abstract away from the counts of commercial vice 
activity by indicating whether commercial vice activity is present or absent in each 
county-year.  
Table 5 reports the results of this analysis. Across all models, we see three trends. 
First, the estimate on Craigslist entry is positive and significant, signifying that 
independent sex workers do operate on Craigslist. Second, we note that the interaction 
                                                 
27 The interpretation of results builds on the rationale that online prostitution that takes 






term is positively significant, indicating that the increase in prostitution incidence occurs 
in site entry locations that have commercial vice activities. These two findings jointly 
suggest that the prostitution market enabled by Craigslist is made up of both independent 
sex workers and prostitutes working under commercial vice organizations. A comparison 
of these coefficient sizes suggest that the prostitution by commercial vice groups are at 
least two times larger than that made up by independent providers. Third, the commercial 
vice variable holds a negative estimate, indicating that counties with commercial vice 
activity but no Craigslist presence are experiencing a drop in prostitution activity. Such a 
trend is reflective of a shift from street prostitution to online prostitution. 
Table 5: Involvement of Commercial Vice on Craigslist-Enabled Prostitution 
Variables 
TER: All Years 
(Using Craigslist) 
TER: Active Years 
(Using Craigslist) 
Counts of Com.  
Vice Activity 
Binary Indicator for 
Com. Vice Activity 
Counts of Com.  
Vice Activity 
Binary Indicator 
for Com. Vice 
Activity 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Commercial Vice -0.075* -0.154*** -0.066* -0.130*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Craigslist Entry 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.059** 0.071*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Craigslist Entry ×  
Commercial Vice 
0.201*** 0.711*** 0.172*** 0.597*** 
(0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) 
R-squared 0.258 0.226 0.236 0.204 
F-Stats 13.319 7.711 10.737 6.446 
Observations 16735 16735 16735 16735 
Note. All dependent variables are the log number of prostitution cases from TER that are 
known to utilize Craigslist in their solicitation. For Models 1 and 3, the counts of 
commercial vice activity are log-transformed, while the commercial vice variable for 
Models 2 and 4 are binary indicators. Robust standard errors clustered by counties are 
reported in parentheses. All control variables and fixed effects reported in Table 2 are 
included. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
6.2 Geographic Trends 
To examine the growth patterns of online prostitution, we repeat our main analysis on 





Prostitution history is based on whether a county has existing prostitutes that are 
documented on the TER site. In Models 1 and 2 of Table 6, we find that Craigslist’s entry 
has a positive and significant impact on prostitution trends for both counties that have and 
do not have a pre-existing trend of prostitution. We find that the impact of Craigslist on 
prostitution tends to be stronger for counties with pre-existing prostitution trends (18.88% 
increase in Model 2) compared to locations that do not (11.29% increase in Model 1). 
This set of results is consistent with the theory positing that transacting parties of 
prostitution tend to conjugate spatially such that search costs for locating each other are 
reduced. However, the results also indicate that Craigslist, as a platform, also facilitates 
the new prostitution cases in areas that do not have a history of prostitution. Such a 
finding is also reasonable when we consider that online solicitation reduces the likelihood 
of detection and legal persecution, which can lead individuals at the boundary of 
participation to enter the market when discreet forms of transaction become available. 
 
Table 6: Geographical Trends Related to Prostitution Increase  
Variables 
Presence of Existing Prostitution Spillover Effects 
No Prior  
Trends 
Has Prior  
Trends 





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Craigslist Entry 
0.107*** 0.173** 0.163*** 0.129*** 
(0.02) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) 
R-squared 0.107 0.540 0.240 0.192 
F-Stats 3.805 11.312 7.655 5.770 
Observations 16046 689 761 761 
Note. The dependent variables are the log number of prostitution from TER known to 
solicit on Craigslist under the Active Years (using Craigslist) definition. Robust standard 
errors clustered by counties are reported in parentheses. All covariates and fixed effects 





6.3 Spillover Effects 
Many small and mid-sized cities do not have a dedicated Craigslist site serving its locale. 
Thus, it is possible for sex workers and clients residing in locations without Craigslist to 
rely on sites from a neighboring location to set up arrangements for sexual transactions. 
Under this possibility, the entry of Craigslist to a major city may lead to spillovers of 
increased prostitution incidence in neighboring locations. To test for a spillover effect, we 
first identify a set of county-pairs in which one of the counties has Craigslist and the 
other does not (details provided in Appendix 3). We run two separate regressions in our 
newly derived sample. In the first regression, we regress prostitution incidence on 
Craigslist’s entry for counties that have experienced site entry. In the second regression, 
we regress prostitution incidence of the neighboring county on the same Craigslist entry 
variable, along with all covariates associated with the neighboring county. In the case of a 
spillover effect, the Craigslist variable would show positive and significant coefficients in 
both models. Table 6 reports results of this analysis. 
We find a positive and significant impact of Craigslist’s on prostitution incidence 
for counties that experience site entry in Model 3. In Model 4, we find that the impact of 
Craigslist’s entry also holds a positive and significant impact on prostitution incidence in 
the adjacent county without Craigslist. A comparison of the estimates further indicates 
that the magnitude of the spillover effect is smaller (12.9% in Model 4) than the main 
effect (16.3% in Model 3). This is reasonable given that neighboring counties without site 
entry tend to be smaller cities relative to the focal county with site entry, which are 





6.4 Types of Sexual Services  
The growth of online prostitution stemming from Craigslist entry may be made up of an 
increase in niche sexual services (e.g., sadomasochism and sex with transgender 
providers) that are otherwise hard to locate without online intermediation. Using the 
attributes of sex workers reviewed on TER, we identify and tabulate the frequency of 
prostitutes providing the following services, namely escort, massage, S&M, and 
transsexual. To assess whether site entry lead to an increase in workers that provide niche 
sexual services, we first measure the impact of Craigslist on the incidence of S&M and 
transsexual services. The increase in these exotic services is further contrasted with the 
increase in prostitutes who only offered traditional sexual services (i.e., escort and 
massage), so as to gain an understanding towards the relative increase in across these 
services. We report the regression results in Table 7. 
Table 7: Types of Sexual Services 
Variables 
S&M / Transsexual Escort / Massage 




R-squared 0.082 0.128 
F-Stats 2.898 4.399 
Observations 16735 16735 
Note. The dependent variables are the log count of prostitutes from TER known to solicit 
on Craigslist. These counts are tabulated by the types of sexual services provided.  For 
Model 1, we include workers in the count as long as they provide either S&M or 
transsexual services. For Model 2, we include workers who provide only escort and 
massage services, since these are basic services that are provided by almost all workers. 
Robust standard errors clustered by counties are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
values. All control variables and fixed effects reported in Table 2 are included. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
We find that Craigslist entry lead to an increase in sex workers who offers exotic 
sexual services. With the entry of Craigslist, providers offering these niche services have 





have increased by 15.37 percent. While the increase in prostitution is largely constituted 
by workers who provide traditional sexual services, we find that site entry has also led to 
a sizable increase in workers who provided niche services. In particular, the increase in 
workers who provided niche services is about 40 percent of the gain in workers who 
perform only traditional services. 
A related sub-question involves understanding how prostitution trends increase 
with the availability of an online platform. Specifically, the introduction of the Craigslist 
site could increase the number of solicitations from existing sex workers, and it could 
also increase the number of new workers entering the market. To investigate the first 
possibility, we rely on the number of reviews of existing workers (profiles that are on 
TER for at least two years) as a dependent variable to proxy for the number of 
prostitution instances. Results in Model 1 (Table 8) shows that the Craigslist entry 
indicator holds a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that the presence of the 
site does increase the incidence of solicitations of existing workers. We investigate the 
second possibility by utilizing the number of new TER profiles in each county-year as a 
dependent variable to proxy for number of new market entrants. This analysis helps to 
supplement the earlier results derived under the outcome variables which considers both 
existing and new workers (i.e., entire market size). Model 2 shows that site entry also has 







Table 8: Impact on Existing and New Sex Workers 
 
Number of Reviews for  
Existing Sex Workers 
Number of  
New Sex Workers 




R-squared 0.081 0.109 
F-Stats 3.157 4.135 
Observations 16735 16735 
Note. Dependent variable for Model 1 is log number of TER reviews for existing sex 
workers. Dependent variable in Model 2 is log number of new TER sex workers who are 
using Craigslist. Robust standard errors clustered by counties are reported in parentheses 
below coefficient values. All control variables and fixed effects reported in Table 2 are 
included.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
6.5 Policing Efficacy  
Law enforcement has relied on Craigslist to locate sex workers and plan sting operations. 
An understanding of the relative impacts that Craigslist has on facilitating prostitution 
acts and enhancing policing efficiency provides insight on whether the shutdown of 
Craigslist’s “Adult services” section is justified. We contrast the impact of Craigslist 
entry on the incidence of prostitute reviewed on TER and the number of indoor female 
prostitutes arrested. Specifically, we juxtapose the entry coefficients for prostitution 
arrests on the time falsification results that were previously derived from Figure 1.  
In Figure 2, we note the post-entry coefficients for prostitution arrests increase in 
magnitude over the years, indicating that policing efforts in curbing prostitution trends 
are enhanced after Craigslist entry. Specifically, we find that the effect sizes grow from 
4.71 percent in the first year of entry to 47.54 percent in the fourth year of site entry. 
However, the gap in growth rate between prostitution incidence and police arrests widens 
over time, as the coefficients derived under the TER-based definition of prostitution 





that the efficacy gained in police arrests is much smaller than the increase in prostitution 
enabled by the site. 
 
Figure 2 - Impact on Prostitution Incidence and Arrests 
(at 95% confidence level) 
Note: Prostitution count under the definition of TER: Active Years (Using Craigslist) is 
used to plot the graph involving TER prostitution incidence. Prostitution Arrests under 
the FBI data is used to plot the other graph. 
 
6.6 Relationship across Ad Types  
News reports have documented that sex workers have used the casual encounters section 
within ‘Personals ads’ to post prostitution ads in the effort to generate more business 
leads (Alban 2005). In addition, men who are originally looking for non-paid hookups in 
the “Personals” section may move towards the erotic service listings in search for niche 
sexual services provided by sex workers. Interestingly, through self-reports, we note 
instances of female users who initially look for dates in the “Personals” section may later 





ups (Segura 2007). Given these observations, we seek to examine the underlying 
economic relationship between these two ad types on prostitution levels.  
To this end, we collected data on the number of ads in each section and use that as 
regressors in the main models. For this analysis, the count of Personal ads includes casual 
encounter ads, and heterosexual ads (i.e., M4W and W4M), since TER sex worker 
profiles are all females that serve male clients. We enter each of these regressors 
separately into the main models to understand their basic relationship with prostitution 
count. To assess the economic nature between these two ad types, we further add both 
regressors, along with their interaction term in the same model to check the signs of their 
coefficients. In Models 1 and 2 of Table 9, we see that erotic sex ads and casual sex ads 
both exhibited a positive and significant impact on prostitution levels. In Model 3, we 
find that the interaction terms between the erotic service ads and the personal ads is 
positive and significant, indicating a complementary effect between the erotic service ads 
and the personals ads on prostitution incidence. 
Table 9: Impact of Erotic and Casual sex ads on Prostitution 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log (Erotic sex ads) 
0.083***  -0.098 
(0.02)  (0.06) 
Log (Casual sex ads) 
 0.074*** 0.055 
 (0.02) (0.04) 
Interaction Term 
  0.014** 
  (0.01) 
Time-varying County-Specific Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
R-squared 0.489 0.491 0.492 
F-Stats 11.089 10.885 10.929 
Observations 4403 4403 4403 
Note. All dependent variables are Log (TER: Active Years, Using Craigslist). All 
covariates in the main model are included here. In Model 1, erotic sex ads includes ads 
from erotic services section (or adult services section) of Craigslist. In Model 2, casual 
sex ads include Craigslist’s personals section ads, like men for women (m4w) ads, 
women for men (w4m) ads, and casual encounter ads from Craigslist. Robust standard 
errors clustered by metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) are reported in parentheses below 
coefficient values. All control variables and fixed effects at MSA and year levels reported 





7. Discussion and Implications 
In this paper, we study the link between Craigslist’s entry and prostitution trends, and 
uncovered a positive impact of site entry on prostitution trends. In our analysis, we 
exploit the exogenous entry of Craigslist via a difference-in-difference setup to estimate 
the site entry effect on prostitution incidence. We find that this relationship persists 
across various robustness checks. Falsification tests suggest that this observed 
relationship did not arise spuriously. On top of the main relationship, we also performed 
six sub-analyses, to uncover the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon, including the 
relationship with respect to commercial vice, geographical trends, spillover effects, 
sexual services, policing efficacy, and different ads. 
Our study holds several implications for various stakeholders, including policy 
makers, site owners, enforcement agencies, and academics. First, our study provides new 
inputs for policy makers and site owners. Based on conservative model estimates, we find 
that Craigslist entry, on average, is linked with a 17.58 percent increase in annual 
prostitution incidence at a county.28 If we were to consider counties that have at least one 
incidence of prostitution, an 18% increase represents a gain of approximately one 
prostitute in a county-year. Despite this modest increase in actual count, the reported 
effect grows exponentially over time, and can culminate to a 211 percent increase within 
four years. This rapid growth in prostitution levels should not be ignored. Moreover, the 
effect size unveiled in our estimations is likely just the tip of the iceberg of the actual 
                                                 
28 In raw numbers, a 17.58% increase means that average prostitution levels would 
increase to 0.18 workers in a county-year. This modest impact is due to the low average 





impact. Given that the true impact of Craigslist on prostitution incidence is likely to be 
greater than our reported estimates, the uncovered relationship serves to affirm the 
soundness of the decisions made to intervene in the operation of platforms that facilitate 
prostitution. In addition, our study findings add to the ongoing policy debate of making 
website owners legally responsible for criminal acts that are facilitated through their 
sites.29 Despite sentiments against the regulation of websites on the basis of protecting 
freedom of speech (Lee 2013), additional clauses to the dated CDA should be considered 
to account for circumstances where sites are clearly fostering criminal acts. Evidently, the 
self-governance model does not work, as our study results demonstrate that users are 
capitalizing on the lack of regulation to participate in online prostitution.  
Second, our finding on the involvement of organized vice groups with prostitution 
on Craigslist highlights the socio-legal concerns related to the introduction of online 
platforms. This issue is especially pressing given that the majority of the prostitution 
facilitated by Craigslist is likely induced by organized vice groups as opposed to 
voluntary prostitution. Given the organized prostitution operations tend to co-exist with 
sex trafficking (Schauer and Wheaton 2006), an increase in Craigslist-based prostitution 
in locations with commercial vice activities is likely linked with an increase in sex 
trafficking. The presence of an online venue to facilitate prostitution can drive up demand 
for paid sexual services, which induces vice organizations to increase their sex trafficking 
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efforts, leading to greater exploitation of vulnerable populations into the sex trade (Hanna 
2002). Additionally, prostitution is linked to the proliferation of other illicit activities, 
namely drug trafficking and drug abuse, which feeds the sex trade. In sum, forced 
prostitution facilitated by online platforms can lead to a host of other criminal and illegal 
activities, which are highly damaging social consequences. 
While criminals are quick on tapping online capabilities to engage in prostitution, 
policing agencies have not caught up with the use of online affordances to keep illicit 
activities in check. While Craigslist-enabled prostitution has grown exponentially, the 
efficacy gained in prostitution arrests after site launch is at best modest. To address the 
gap between crime growth and enforcement effectiveness, the realignment of policing 
resources from an offline-heavy allocation scheme to one that balances allocation across 
online and offline modes is needed. By tracking illicit activities online and cracking these 
perpetrators, legal enforcement can deter crimes by raising the costs to make illicit 
transactions online. 
Third, our findings provide insights on the growth pattern of online prostitution. 
Our analyses indicate that Craigslist entry is likely to increase prostitution in all 
geographies regardless of existing prostitution, though a greater increase is found in 
locations with existing prostitution. Moreover, the impact of Craigslist on prostitution is 
not limited to locations that experience site entry, but can spill over to neighboring cities 
not served by the platform. At the same time, the growth of prostitution enabled by 
Craigslist manifest in two ways: 1) increases transactions of existing workers, and 2) 
attracts new market entrants. These insights have specific implications to enforcement 





policing agents need to strengthen their enforcement strategies in areas with existing 
prostitution trends, they would also need to delegate resources towards locations that do 
not have existing prostitution and to cities that are likely to experience spillover effects. 
Fourth, our study builds on top of the findings of Chan and Ghose (2014) by 
providing a more comprehensive picture of Craigslist’s entry effect on other societal 
outcomes. Chan and Ghose (2014) find that the escort ads on Craigslist have a 
dampening effect on HIV incidence. The magnitude of this dampening effect, when 
compared to the HIV-inducing effect from “Personal ads”, is relatively small.30 Through 
this study, we further found a complementary relationship between erotic ads and casual 
hookup ads, suggesting that users are likely to use both the nonmarket and prostitution 
sections simultaneously when seeking sexual acts, which consequently leads to an 
increase in prostitution counts. Juxtaposing these observations, it is likely that any 
reductions in HIV incidence through erotic service ads would be nullified by the increase 
in HIV prevalence, as users who seek prostitution services on Craigslist may also seek 
casual partners from the nonmarket ads, an act known to increase HIV incidence. The 
joint consideration of the current findings with that from Chan and Ghose (2014) 
indicates an unambiguous conclusion --- online platforms that facilitate sexual 
solicitation bear an overall negative impact on social well-being. 
 Fifth, our results also make theoretical contributions to the literature of online 
platforms. While past studies examined whether online platforms affect consumer 
                                                 
30 From Chan and Ghose (2014), it is seen that a 10% increase in erotic ads is linked with 
a 0.7% decrease in HIV cases, while the same increase in personal ads leads to a 1.7% 





surplus, price dispersion, and competition (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Brynjolfsson 
and Smith 2000, Brown and Goolsbee 2000), we complement this line of work by 
investigating a more fundamental relationship involving the impact of online platforms 
on market participation, in the underexplored context of prostitution. The study finding of 
a positive relationship between Craigslist entry and prostitution activities enriches our 
understanding of the nature of online platforms under the context of illegal transactions. 
The willingness to participate in prostitution via Craigslist, despite the potential risk of 
legal punishment, is likely encouraged by the perception that these transactions are 
significantly less risky, as illicit behaviors may be masked by the veil of anonymity in 
online platforms (Grewal et al. 2004). Moreover, the availability of such services as 
facilitated by online affordances can lead to the discounting of future costs when satiating 
immediate needs (Strack and Deutsch 2004). These theoretical explanations are aligned 
with our empirical findings, and are supported by anecdotal accounts in other contexts, 
namely the increased sales of drugs and firearms with the increasing use of the dark net.31  
Moreover, our sub-findings on the growth patterns of Craigslist-enabled 
prostitution further provide nuanced insights on the impacts of online platforms with 
regards to its geographical reach. While past studies have found mixed results in terms of 
whether the effect of platforms extend beyond the local geography of the participants, our 
study findings revealed that both possibilities are realized in the prostitution market, 
suggesting that the type of market served by the platform can drastically affect the 
                                                 







geographical impacts of the online intermediary. Akin to the used vehicle market 
(Overby and Forman 2015), the gain in utility that accrues from bodily pleasures and 
monetary payoffs from sexual transactions can reduce the sensitivity towards 
geographical constraints, motivating participants to travel to neighboring locations that 
are not directly served by the Craigslist to transact. Similar to the crowdfunding context 
(Lin and Viswanathan 2016), the prostitution market facilitated by the Craigslist platform 
enjoys the largest growth in areas that are directly available to both the participants, as 
the participation costs in these locations are the lowest. Finally, our sub-result shows 
evidence of the long tail principle at work in our study. To this point, we observe that the 
growth of Craigslist-enabled prostitution is constituted by a sizeable increase of workers 
who provide niche sexual services such as S&M and transsexual services, which serves 
as another validation of long tail effects in online environments. 
Our paper is not free from limitations, which leaves potential for future research 
to expand on our work. First, our study results are limited to showing the relationship 
between online classified ad sites and prostitution trends. It is possible that other sites or 
mobile apps, (e.g., Eros.com and Tinder), may facilitate the sexual solicitation 
differently, leading to a differentiated set of users from that of Craigslist. For instance, it 
is recently reported that sex workers are using Tinder profiles as a masquerade to solicit 
clients on the dating app (Dewey 2014).  Such approaches may face a set of payoffs and 
costs that are different from those from Craigslist, resulting in different market outcomes 
and mechanisms. Second, our study findings are restricted to the U.S. Though similar 
classified ad sites and solicitation sites operate in other countries, various local factors 





and legality of prostitution, along with socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of 
other nations differs from those of the U.S., which can influence entry impacts. Third, it 
is unclear whether our observed effects will change beyond 2008. In extending our work, 
future studies may examine whether the closure of Craigslist’s solicitation section has an 
impact on overall prostitution. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our paper represents one of the first works that 
systematically quantifies the impact of Craigslist’s entry on prostitution trends, and have 
examined the pathways by which the prostitution is impacted by digital platforms. As the 
use of community-based websites increases, the interplay between platforms and social 
outcomes warrants greater attention. The unintended use of such sites can result in 
undesirable criminal acts that undermine legal and judiciary system. There is a need for 
the law enforcement agencies to keep up with the evolution of online technologies and to 
adopt new approaches to curb Internet-facilitated crimes. At the same time, site owners 







Essay 2 – Are Yang and McSteamy More Receptive to a 
Hot Vote than Meredith and George? Heterogeneity in 
Treatment Effects in Online Dating 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent research has shown that one-third of marriages in the United States begin 
online (Cacioppo et al. 2013), while almost half of singles went out for date with 
someone they met online (Canaday and Ross 2017).The number of online dating sites is 
large and growing, with estimates of around 2500 online dating sites in the US alone32 
and 1400 in the UK33. These sites vary in the target audience (e.g. based on sexuality, 
religion, age), their objectives (e.g. long-term vs. short-term relationships), and, an 
important aspect related to this study, the features they offer their users. 
A key distinguishing feature of online dating versus its traditional counterpart is 
the ability within dating websites to leave a range of digital signals not replicable in the 
offline world, which can play an important role in matching outcomes. Given the 
frictions prevalent in the offline dating world, online dating platforms are introducing 
new IT-enabled features in order to mitigate the social frictions in the off-line world. 
Digital platforms are motivated to evaluate such features using experiments given that 
two-thirds of the features that platforms introduce do not show any significant effect 
(Kohavi and Thomke 2017).  In the context of an online dating platform, in particular, a 









prior randomized experiment with the anonymous browsing feature demonstrates that a 
particular subtle pattern (known as “weak signals”) of online communication between 
women and men is critical in achieving successful matches, particularly for women 
(Bapna et al., 2016). While that study demonstrates the importance of weak-signaling, 
which allows regular online profile visits to constitute an important mechanism in dating 
markets, it offered no recommendations regarding how to push users to actively visit 
others.   
Therefore, our study aims to test the usefulness of one popular feature 
implemented in dating websites that may encourage user engagement, and more 
importantly, matching of dates – the vote-identity revelation. Online dating platforms 
typically allow users to “vote” for other users. While information from this feature is 
used behind-the-scenes by the dating platforms for potential mate recommendations, it is 
typically not revealed to the users themselves. Our study looks at one aspect of this 
feature, enabling treated users to observe the identity of the user who has (secretly) voted 
for them by revealing the profile picture icons of voters who liked the treated user and 
therefore reducing the information asymmetry between users of treated and control 
groups.34 Hence, the main focus of this paper is to understand the impact of a strong-
signaling identity-revelation feature on user engagement and matching outcomes. We 
suggest that this intervention will increase engagement on the online dating site, and 
induce users to visit others’ profiles more often and ultimately, achieve more matches. 
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profile picture icon and access the voter’s online dating profile. Therefore, our treatment 





Following prior work showing heterogeneous preferences by gender in matching in 
marriage markets (Hitsch et al. 2010) and online dating platforms (Bapna et al. 2016, 
Jung et al. 2018), we separate all of our analysis by gender.  We ask how the impact of 
this feature will vary across demographic characteristics including gender, age, ethnicity, 
and physique type35 as well as attractiveness. The specific research questions we ask are:  
1. How does vote-identity revelation feature impact the number of views, messages, 
and matches that a user sends or receives? How does this effect vary by gender?  
2. What are the differential impacts of the vote-identity revelation feature based on 
difference in users age group, ethnicity, and physique type? How do these effects 
vary by gender? 
3. Separately for both genders, what are the differential impact of vote-identity 
revelation feature based on difference in users own attractiveness levels and 
users’ average voters’ attractiveness levels?36  
To address these questions, we partner with a large North American online dating site 
that we call monCherie.com, to run a randomized field experiment. In this experiment, 
we follow 100,000 newly registered users, and gift a random sample of 50,000 users a 
feature that allows treated users to see the identity of voters who rated a treated user with 
a like. This ability is unique to the online environment as we explain in detail in the 
following paragraph.  
                                                 
35 or, body type. 
36 A user’s average voters’ attractiveness level is the average of attractiveness levels of all 





On the dating site we partner with, as well as in many other online dating sites, 
users can receive and provide attractiveness ratings on a {0, 1}-scale, whereby an user 
can dislike or like another user. The default setting is that the identity of raters is kept 
secret, in that they are not visible or known to the focal user who receives attractiveness 
ratings. The focal user can receive messages from the site indicating that “X” number of 
users have rated them with a like, but these messages do not contain the identity of the 
users who have rated them with a like.37 However, in matching markets such as online 
dating, the raters’ identity information serves as a key ingredient for the background 
recommendation and matching engine of the site. Thus, the default setting in online 
dating resembles that of the offline dating market, in that there exists information 
asymmetry about people’s preferences for each other.  Specifically, even though a focal 
user (ratee) may have been rated with a like by another user (rater), she would not be 
aware of the identity of the particular user who rated her with a like. This creates 
information asymmetry in that the rater holds information that the ratee does not have 
access to. The vote-identity revelation feature breaks down this information asymmetry 
by informing the ratee of the identity of the rater if the rater has given her “thumbs up” 
for attractiveness.  
Theories prevalent in the computer mediated communication (CMC) literature 
and information processing literature, suggest that the impact of the vote-identity 
revelation feature on users’ communication related outcomes could be diverse. 
According to the media richness theory, using CMC can provide a limited bandwidth to 
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convey social cues due to its leaner interface, and this makes the platform less useful for 
tasks related to negotiating social relations. Yet with multiplicity of cues, like adding the 
vote-identity revelation feature, we can expect better users’ performance in CMC for an 
equivocal task like searching and communicating with a potential date (Dennis and 
Kinney 1998). In addition, the social information processing theory (SIPT) suggests that 
users can expect a better relationship outcome in CMC with passage of enough time and 
exchange of enough messages, when engaged in utilizing the communication cues 
available in the online environment (Walther 1992 and 1995). Further, Walther (1996) 
proposed that CMC have the potential to become “hyperpersonal,” whereby a heightened 
level of fondness and intimacy is possible in computer-mediated mediums for 
communication. Later, empirical research that uses SIPT under online dating context 
shows that Walther’s theory also explains user intimacy and impression formation for 
online dating users (Ellison et al. 2006, Gibbs et al. 2006, Farrer et al. 2009).  
When looking for the impact of identity-descriptive communication cues, 
evidence from research in online communities shows that community members find these 
cues helpful when evaluating online reviews, and experience positive impression 
formation while rating the reviews with identity-descriptive cues (Forman et al. 2008). 
Similarly, in our online dating context, the vote-identity revelation feature contain 
identity-descriptive information that can powerfully influence dating website users’ 
engagement and matching responses within the site. Therefore, with support from extant 
literature in CMC and information processing, we expect that our strong-signaling 
intervention in the online dating context will lead to more engagement and matching 





 Our results show that, indeed, both female and male treated users experience a 
boost in engagement with the online dating site. That is, not only do we causally show 
that the communication of a treated user increases, but the overall likelihood of initiating 
communication increases for women who have the vote-identity revelation feature. We 
find that there is 12.59% overall increase in matches for the participants in the dating 
markets, whereas there is 17.69% increase in matches for treated women. This is 
particularly important given that women have been shown to adhere to social norms that 
dictate that they are less likely to initiate communication or make the first move (Bapna 
et al. 2016). The vote-identity revelation feature seems to trigger women to overcome 
inhibitions and initiate interactions. This demonstrates how technology-enabled features 
such as information-revelation about the identity of a user who has liked the focal user, 
can improve the efficacy of an age-old social process linked to human happiness, such as 
finding a date.   
Further, our results indicate that there is heterogeneity in treatment effects across 
age, ethnicity, and body type dimensions whereby different user cohorts have different 
reaction to the treatment. We also find heterogeneity in treatment effects based on the 
treated user’s own attractiveness levels, user’s average voters’ attractiveness levels, and 
the interaction of the treatment with user’s own attractiveness scores and average voters’ 
attractiveness scores.  Our results show that for male users, we identify a positive “ego 
effect” for those who have high own attractiveness scores since their self-initiated 
matches increases while viewing and messaging other females decreases. It can be argued 
that the vote-identity revelation feature makes highly attractive male users confident and 





outcomes. On the other hand, when receiving votes from a pool of highly attractive 
voters, we find that females experience an “encouragement effect,” and their overall self-
initiated engagement and matching outcomes in the dating website increases. Finally, we 
used a three-way interaction among the vote-identity revelation treatment, user’s own 
attractiveness score, and user’s average voter’s attractiveness score, and found a 
dampening effect on all online dating activity levels (like viewing, messaging, and 
matching) that was present for both genders. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the literature. Section 3 describes the institutional details of monCherie.com, 
the online dating site that we partner with to conduct our randomized experiment. Section 
4 explains the setup of the randomized experiment as well as some empirical regularities. 
Section 5 describes our results. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and provide a 
discussion of our findings.  
2. Literature  
Our study is at the intersection of literatures related to dating markets, marriage 
markets, and online ratings.  A key finding in the literature on dating and marriage 
markets is the gender asymmetry in preferences and actions (Fisman et al. 2006, Hitsch et 
al. 2010) and, relatedly, the social frictions that exist in these markets (Piskorski 2012, 
Bapna et al. 2016).  Prior research has demonstrated that women and men have 
asymmetric preferences for characteristics of a potential partner: women place a higher 
importance on intelligence (Fisman et al. 2006), income and education (Hitsch et al. 





Another source of gender asymmetry in dating and marriage markets comes from 
social frictions. These social frictions are often a result of high search costs due to, for 
example, geographical constraints and incomplete information about a potential partner, 
but also come from existing social norms. While many search frictions are reduced in the 
online context, the social frictions stemming from asymmetric social norms still exist. In 
particular, the age-old social norms that inhibit women from making the first move are 
still evident in online dating markets (Piskorski 2012, Bapna et al. 2016).  
Dating markets uphold other sources of asymmetries along demographic 
dimensions. Extant research has shown that dating preferences and actions differ along 
the dimensions of age groups, ethnicity and body types. When looking at gender and age 
groups differences, it is reported in relationship sciences literature that men seek younger 
women, while women seek older men (Bolig et al., 1984). Further, studies showing 
differences in dating attitudes between younger and older women reported that, with 
increase in age, older women systematically seek men closer to their own age, or even 
seek younger men (Harrison and Saeed 1977, Jagger 2005). For men, with increase in 
age, older men preferred increasingly younger females (Alterovitz et al. 2011). Literature 
on racial impacts on dating shows that at the time of initiating communication, African 
Americans and Hispanics are less interested in the erotic or sexual aspect of dating than 
their White counter parts (Glenn and Marquardt, 2001). As a result, hookups38 were not 
popular among African American and Latino groups during initial dating encounters 
(Williams 1998). Further, studies have shown that females across all races show same-
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race preferences, whereas men are open to inter-racial dates (Fisman et al. 2008, Hitsch et 
al. 2006, Yancey 2009). In relation to the literature on body types and dating, Glasser et 
al. (2009) reported African American and Hispanic men prefer heavy bodied or curvy 
females, while White males tend to like thin and toned female physical appearances.  
Prior work has also shown that individual attractiveness also plays a crucial role 
in shaping relationships, but the direction of its effect at influencing relationships is 
ambiguous in extant literature. On one hand, attractive people fare better in life outcomes 
than unattractive people according to previous studies (Eagly et al., 1991; Langlois et al., 
2000). Research in social psychology has linked attractiveness with confidence under 
social judgement situations and performance in the job market context (Mobius and 
Rosenblat 2006). Further, in dating studies, assortative matching on the dimension of 
attractiveness has been the trend reported, which suggests that users match along similar 
levels of attractiveness (Hitsch et al. 2010). On the other hand, individuals who are highly 
attractive, will likely have access to more and better alternatives. This makes them pricey 
and feel less dependent on new sources of relationships (Thibaut and Kelley 1959, Lewin 
et al. 1944). When taken to an extreme, individuals are subject to negative implicit 
evaluations based on their attractiveness levels (Maner et al., 2009). Such negative 
evaluations have implication for interpersonal derogation (Agthe & Sporrle, 2009; 
Forsterling et al., 2007) and social avoidance (Agthe et al., 2008). Finally, the role of 
attractiveness in mating literature have revealed that attractiveness matters when seeking 
romantic-partners albeit often asymmetrically across genders (Eastwick and Finkel 2008; 





Finally, our work relates with the online ratings literature. Prior work has 
demonstrated the importance of technology enabled signaling mechanisms to tackle 
social inhibitions in dating markets, an example is non-anonymous browsing of profiles 
(Bapna et al. 2016). Online rating systems are another mechanism of signaling used in 
many other online markets such as eBay, Amazon, iTunes, Spotify, Netflix, and others. 
Research on online rating systems has indicated the positive impact that positive product 
ratings have on sales of books (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), movies (Liu 2006, 
Dellarocas et al. 2007), and music (Dewan and Ramaprasad 2012) and the importance of 
such ratings for buyers and sellers on eBay (Standifird 2001, Resnick and Zeckhauser 
2002). In addition, research on book ratings on Amazon has indicated that identity 
disclosure of the reviewer along with a positive rating is associated with an increase in 
product sales (Forman et al. 2008).  
It is important to note that online rating system used in the context of online 
dating is different from the online rating systems on traditional product platforms. While 
online ratings on product platforms are visible to users and help in making purchase 
decisions, these ratings are not visible on online dating profiles to other users. That is, 
while it is clear on the Amazon.com product page that users, on average, rated a book 
with four stars out of five, these average ratings are not visible on online dating profile 
pages for a visiting user. In actuality, users can see their own ratings in their profile 
pages, but not that of others.39 Thus, the signal of quality or, in the dating context, of 
interest is explicit only to the focal user who interprets self-only ratings as his or her 
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quality in the online dating website. Besides this, the use of the ratings in online dating 
websites are also as a source of information that the site uses on the back-end to feed into 
its recommendation engine and suggest potential mates to users.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature on dating markets and online 
ratings. Accordingly, it aims to fill the gap between the online dating and online ratings 
research streams. We examine the main treatment effects for the vote-identity revelation 
feature on treated users engagement and matching outcome in the dating website. We 
also look at heterogeneity in treatment effects along demographic dimensions, like 
gender, age group, ethnicity, and body type. Finally, we study the role of attractiveness of 
focal users and voting users in moderating the effects of the vote-identity revelation 
feature. In the next section we discuss the institutional details of our partner online dating 
website, where we conducted the randomized field experiment.  
3. Institutional Details  
To conduct the experiment, we partnered with one of the largest online dating 
websites in North America, which we call monCherie.com (name disguised). 
MonCherie.com constitutes a regular online dating website and offers the following 
features to its users, which are typical of most other online dating websites:  
• Users may set up their own well-structured online profiles where they describe 
themselves as well as reveal characteristics sought in a desired partner. Users may 
also include a set of their photos in their viewable profiles.  
• Users may view profiles of all other users without limitations.  
• Users may search for profiles of other users using an advanced search engine that 





variables. Users may also discover partners using a proprietary recommendation 
engine that is provided by the website.  
• Users may send private messages to any other user.  
• Users may like-vote other users when they visit their profile pages; In the online 
dating website’s proprietary recommendation engine that allows users to discover 
partners by showing them profiles of potential matches, users can like or dislike 
other users.40  
In addition to these features, monCherie.com constitutes a typical freemium community: 
most of the users sign up for a free account (“free users”), which allows them to utilize all 
the key features listed above. In addition to these free features, users can obtain a 
premium subscription if they pay approximately $1 per month (exact value changed for 
de-identification purposes). The premium subscription consists of a fixed bundle of 
premium features that include, among other incremental features, the ability to 
anonymously browse profiles of other users (Bapna et al. 2016) and the feature we study 
here, vote-identity revelation, the ability to view the identity of the users who have given 
a focal user a like. 
4. Experiment, Data, and Empirical Regularities  
Our experiment was conducted on 100,000 new users of monCherie.com, the 
online dating partner website, over three consecutive months, referred as Month 1 (Pre-
treatment), Month 2 (During treatment) and Month 3 (Post-treatment) in year 2016. A 
randomly selected treatment group of 50,000 users was treated with a gift of one month 
                                                 
40 In the mobile phone version of the website, users can swipe right to like other users, 





of the vote-identity revelation feature during Month 2, while the remaining users stayed 
with the default settings and served as our control group. Figure 3 shows the vote-identity 
revelation experiment diagrammatically.  
 
Figure 3 - Vote-identity revelation experiment  
Our vote-identity revelation treatment was randomly assigned that makes it a 
strictly exogenous instrument. Therefore, using this randomized controlled trial set up we 
can causally identify the treatments effects. As a result, our study is free from 
endogeneity concerns, and other non-random differences that can partially explain our 
observed difference in treated and control groups, which if present could confound the 
analysis.  Further, the treatment was implemented automatically by the website, whereby 
the treated users received the treatment as a gift, without any required actions on their 
side, and we do not ask for anything in exchange from these users. Further, users are 
unaware of being a part of the experiment, so observer bias is not applicable.41  
                                                 
41 Treated users are not aware of the fact that the vote-identity revelation treatment is part 





We collected our data using random sampling, whereby we got data for 100,000 
random users who are part of the experiment, as well as other users who directly 
interacted with the focal users in experiment. We term the users with whom our focal 
users interacted as the first-degree other users group. We further have data from another 
set of users who interacted with the first-degree other users, can call them the second-
degree other users group. For each of the 100,000 users in our experiment, we have time-
stamped viewing, messaging, and critically for this study, we have time-stamped votes 
(i.e. like-vote is 1, dislike-vote is 0), both sent and received by these users.  Further, our 
dataset consists of data from approximately five million first-degree other users of the 
website, who interacted with the focal users through the engagement channels, like 
viewing, messaging, or voting. We also have viewing, messaging, and voting information 
for the second-degree other user’s group.  
In addition, we have data on a set of demographic variables such as gender 
(female or male), age42, sexual orientation (straight, gay, or bisexuals), ethnicity (asian, 
black, white, or mixed race), and body types (average, curvy, fit, or full figured). We are 
also able to determine whether the users are valid (valid = 0 represents an invalid user, if 
the user is a spammer or a bot as determined by internal algorithms at monCherie.com). 
In this study we limit our sample only to users who are straight and valid prior to the 
manipulation.   
For this study, we generate two synthetic demographic variables related to 
attractiveness – user’s own attractiveness score, and user’s average voters’ attractiveness 
                                                 






score. The focal user’s own attractiveness is measured by the own attractiveness score 
variable, which is the total count of like votes divided by the total count of votes. 
Mathematically,  
 
where, i is a focal user, j  J is a voter j who belongs to a set of voters J that gave user i a 
like-vote, and j′ ∈ J′ is a voter j' who belongs to a set of voters J' that gave user i a dislike-
vote.  
The measure user’s average voters’ attractiveness score captures the average 
attractiveness of the voters who like a focal user. Mathematically it can be represented as, 
 
where, i is the focal user, j ∈ J is a voter j who belongs to a set of voters J that gave user i 
a like-vote, and Own Attractiveness Scorej is the own attractiveness score measure for 
user j. 
Table 10 compares the treatment and control groups separately for both genders 
for a few selected variables (age, white, and own attractiveness score) in the time period 
prior to manipulation.43 It can be seen from Table 10, the treatment and control groups 
are statistically indistinguishable from each other prior to manipulation. It is also 
interesting to note that the own attractiveness scores for males is significantly lower than 
                                                 
43 Pre-treatment comparison results for the entire list of variables is available from 





for females - approximately 0.17 for women compared to 0.08 for men (on a 0-to-1 
scale). In contrast to ratings in other matching markets such as eBay, there is no evidence 
of a leniency effect (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) in user ratings in online dating 
markets.  
Table 10. Pre-Treatment Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups 
Gender Manipulation Variable Mean Std Err t-value p-value 
Female Control Age 30.844 0.242 -0.54 0.587 
Female Treated Age 30.986 0.099   
Female Control White 0.520 0.012 -1.62 0.104 
Female Treated White 0.541 0.005   
Female Control Own Attractiveness Score 0.174 0.005 -0.99 0.322 
Female Treated Own Attractiveness Score 0.181 0.005   
Male Control Age 29.329 0.169 1.62 0.1061 
Male Treated Age 29.232 0.068   
Male Control White 0.502 0.009 -0.68 0.4978 
Male Treated White 0.509 0.004   
Male Control Own Attractiveness Score 0.080 0.001 1.277 0.2018 
Male Treated Own Attractiveness Score 0.079 0.001   
 
In defining our outcome of interest, we use online dating variables like views and 
messages, and rely on prior work on online dating that has defined a “match” as the 
exchange of at least four messages44 between two parties (please see Bapna et al. 2016 
for a detailed description).45 Using this definition, we examine the impact of vote-identity 
                                                 
44 Note that four messages are a lower threshold. Many observed exchange of messages 
are much longer than four messages.  
45 Prior research (Hitsch et al. 2010, Bapna et al. 2016) and anecdotal evidence from 
online dating industry has pointed out that exchange of three messages between potential 
couples is a good predictor of match, when participants exchange phone numbers or ask 
their potential mate out for date during an online dating message exchange session. 
Accordingly, in this paper we conservatively choose exchange of four messages as 





revelation treatment on the number of views, messages, and matches that are both sent 
and received by the focal users. In this study, matches sent are those where the focal user 
initiates the exchange of the four messages, and matches received are those where the 
focal user is the recipient of the first message in the four message exchange. Collectively, 
we term these outcome variables as online dating engagement (i.e. view sent, view 
received, message sent, and message received), and matching (i.e. matches sent and 
matches received) variables. Overall, they are the online dating activity variables. We 
standardize the independent variables to run interpretable econometric models. Table 11 
reports the descriptive statistics of our data separately for both genders.  
Table 11: Summary Statistics From the Vote-Identity Revelation Experiment 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Females 
Vote-identity revelation Treatment 3858 0.504 0.5 0 1 
Own Attractive Score 3358 0.282 0.157 0 1 
Own Attractive Score (Standardized) 3358 0 1 -1.799 4.586 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness Score 3305 0.067 0.036 0 0.8 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness Score (Standardized) 3305 0 1 -1.878 20.473 
View Sent 3858 31.612 77.947 0 1515 
View Received 3858 94.454 147.518 0 3028 
Message Sent 3858 6.789 15.06 0 235 
Message Received 3858 23.174 43.173 0 1342 
Match Sent 3858 0.631 2.205 0 39 
Match Received 3858 3.043 7.127 0 129 
Males 
Vote-identity revelation Treatment 8675 0.496 0.5 0 1 
Own Attractive Score 7829 0.106 0.098 0 1 
Own Attractive Score (Standardized) 7829 0 1 -1.078 9.138 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness Score 7082 0.301 0.138 0 1 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness Score (Standardized) 7082 0 1 -2.181 5.055 
View Sent 8675 57.747 147.228 0 2641 
View Received 8675 16.94 36.438 0 809 
Message Sent 8675 14.21 49.748 0 1116 
Message Received 8675 4.23 11.493 0 204 
Match Sent 8675 1.689 6.313 0 151 
Match Received 8675 0.314 1.035 0 25 
In order to identify the treatment effects in our study, we start with statistical t-test 
modeling, given that our treatment is exogenously administered using a randomized field 





employ a Poisson econometric model to identify the heterogeneity in treatment effects. In 
particular, we estimate regressions of the following form:  
(1) Regression for HTE in User Demographics: In this regression, an online dating 
activity dependent variable is regressed on treatment, along with treatments interaction 
with age group dummies, ethnicity dummies, and body type dummies that represents 





where i indicates the focal user, who can either be in the treatment group or control 
group;  is a representative outcome variable that can 
specifically be views, messages, or matches, both sent or received;  is the 
binary indicator for the vote-identity revelation treatment, which equals to 1 if the user is 
in the treatment group, and equals zero otherwise; coefficient  and  captures the 
independent impact of focal user’s age group dummies, ethnicity dummies, and body 
type dummies, respectively; coefficients  captures the average treatment effect (ATE); 
coefficients  and  captures the heterogeneous treatment effect (HTE) for focal 
user’s age group, ethnicity, and body type demographics, respectively; and  is  the error 
term.  
(2) Regression for HTE in User Attractiveness: In this regression, an online dating 





treatments interaction with users’ own attractiveness score, users’ average voters’ 
attractiveness score, and both such that it represents heterogeneity in treatment effects 







where i indicates the focal user, who can either be in the treatment group or control 
group;  is a representative outcome variable that can 
specifically be views, messages, or matches, both sent or received;  is the 
binary indicator for the vote-identity revelation treatment, which equals to 1 if the user is 
in the treatment group, and equals zero otherwise; coefficient  captures the average 
treatment effect (ATE), holding constant any individual heterogeneity; coefficients  
and  captures the independent impact of focal users’ own attractiveness levels and 
users’ average voters’ attractiveness levels, respectively; coefficient  captures the ego 
effect, due to treatments interaction with users’ own attractiveness levels; whereas, 
coefficient  captures the encouragement effect, due to treatments interaction with 
users’ average voters’ attractiveness levels; the coefficient captures the three-way 
interaction among treatment, users’ own attractiveness, and users’ average voter’s 





variables representing user age cohorts, ethnicities, and body types; and  is  the error 
term.  
5. Experimental Results 
5.1 Main Treatment Effects 
The key differences in users’ engagement and matching outcomes in response to 
the treatment are presented in Table A8 (in Appendix 1). Our results show 12.59% 
overall increase in matches for users of the dating website, where, the female cohort 
largely drives the overall increase in matches with 17.69% increase (Table A8). In order 
to achieve ease of interpretability, we represent the t-test results using Figure 4. The 
figure showcases the ±2 standard error bars from the mean for the online dating activity 
variables (i.e. views, messages, and matches, both sent and received) corresponding to 
the treatment and control groups (i.e. manipulation = 0 is the control group, and 
manipulation = 1 is the treatment group). We highlight all cases with significant 
differences at the 99% level of significance between the treated and control groups with 
black boxes.46 Our results show that females experience a significant increase in self-
initiated views and messages under the influence of the treatment. These key engagement 
metrics are most valuable to the online dating website management as well as female 
website users, given that it is common knowledge that females initiate very low counts of 
engagement outcomes in dating websites. We interpret these results as a boost in female 
confidence due to exposure to the vote-identity revelation treatment, whereby their views 
sent increased by 16.6% and messages sent increased by 12.4%. Further, we find that 
                                                 
46 Thus, our black boxes represent cases were the difference in sample means between 





matches received by females also increased to the order of 17.3%, which suggests that 
increase in engagement is complemented with increase in matches as well for the female 
cohort.47 With regards to males, we found increase in matches received at 95% 
significance level but the match received percentage gain is higher for females.  
 
 Figure 4: Standard error bars showing main treatment effects 
Note. The black box represents cases with significant differences between 
treatment and control groups at p-value ≤ 0.01. Terms rcvd_0 is control group's received 
variable, rcvd_1 is received variable in treatment group, sent_0 is control groups sent 
variable, and sent_1 is treatment group sent variable. Term msg represent messages. 
 
 
                                                 
47 In Figure 4, note that females views, messages and matches received are larger in 
numbers than views, messages and matches sent by them. For males, it’s the opposite 





5.2 Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects (HTE) 
Next, we explore heterogeneity in treatment effects (HTE) along the following 
demographic dimensions - age group, ethnicity, and physique type. The results along the 
age groups dimension are reported in Figure 5.48 We didn’t find any difference between 
sample means of treated and control groups at 99% level of significance, but at 95% level 
of significance (highlighted with dashed black boxes in Figure 5), our results show that 
for females in the ‘18 to 24’ age group, there is significant increase in match received to 
the tune of 55.6%. But more interestingly, females in their forties (i.e. the ‘40 to 49’ age 
group) show a very high 72.7% increase in self-initiated matches, which shows that 
women take the first move. Therefore, two different cohort of female users separated at 
least by fifteen years in age, show significant uptake in their match related outcome 
variables. This suggests that our vote-identity revelation treatment impacts a broader 
spread of women who are substantially dispersed along the age dimension. When looking 
at men, we didn’t find any significant difference in the treatment effect along their 
different age groups.  
                                                 






Figure 5: Heterogeneous treatment effects for different age groups. 
Note. The dashed-black box represents cases with significant differences between 
treatment and control groups at p-value ≤ 0.05. We report matches sent and matches 
received as outcome variables in the figure. Terms rcvd_0 is control groups received 
variable, rcvd_1 is received variable in treatment group, sent_0 is control groups sent 
variable, and sent_1 is treatment group sent variable. 
In Figure 6 we report HTE results for ethnicities White, Black, Asian and mixed 
races.49 At 99% level of significance, our results show significant treatment effects for 
Asian females. Due to the treatment, Asian females significantly increase their self-
initiated matches by a very large 161.4% (reported in Table A10). This result is 
interesting given that in extant studies Asian females are reported as “hyperfeminine,” 
accordingly they show traits like passivity, weakness, quietness, and a sense of duty 
(Espiritu 1997; Tajima 1989; Pyke and Johnson 2003). Therefore, our results show a 
                                                 





counterintuitive scenario, whereby the Asian females experience a boost in confidence 
due to the vote-identity revelation treatment. Further, studies have shown that western 
men are fascinated by Asian women, whereby they perceive Asian women as sexually 
exotic. This trend is colloquially known as ‘Asian fetish,’ or ‘yellow fever’ (Prasso 
2005), which can also account for the increase in matches that we see in our results. 
Accordingly, our results suggest the possibility that Asian females initiate matches with 
White men. 
For females who reported mixed race50 as ethnicity in their dating profile pages, 
we find a significant increase in inbound matches for the treatment group.  These users of 
mixed ethnic background show a very high 127.6% increase in match received at 99% 
level of significance. With regards to White and African American females, our study 
didn’t find any significant treatment effect on match related outcome variables. Further, 
we didn’t find any significant treatment effect for the male user base along the race 
dimension at the 99% level of significance. 
                                                 
50 We define individuals as mixed race when they report themselves with two ethnicities 






Figure 6: Heterogeneous treatment effects for different ethnicities. 
Note. The black box represents cases with significant differences between 
treatment and control groups at p-value ≤ 0.01 We report matches sent and matches 
received as outcome variables in the figure. Terms rcvd_0 is control groups received 
variable, rcvd_1 is received variable in treatment group, sent_0 is control groups sent 
variable, and sent_1 is treatment group sent variable. 
Finally, we look for HTE in physique types as another dimension of 
heterogeneity. We consider average, fit, curvy, and full-figured as the four body types 
cohorts. Our results in Figure 7 show significant treatment effects for females who 
reported themselves as of curvy body type. We find that curvy female show significant 
increase in matches received to the tune of 42.9% (reported in Table A11) at 99% level of 
significance. We further look at curvy females online dating engagement outcome, by 
checking their viewing and messaging behavior, and find that only in their views sent 
there is significant increase at the 99% level of significance (reported in Table A12). 





predominantly driven by outbound profile viewing. Curvy females can leave a ‘weak 
signal’ each time they view a potential mates profile, and this induces men to initiate the 
first message (Bapna et al. 2016). As a result curvy females experience increase in 
inbound matches. 
 
Figure 7: Heterogeneous treatment effects for different body types. 
Note. The black box represents cases with significant differences between 
treatment and control groups at p-value ≤ 0.01. We report matches sent and matches 
received as outcome variables in the figure. Terms rcvd_0 is control groups received 
variable, rcvd_1 is received variable in treatment group, sent_0 is control groups sent 
variable, and sent_1 is treatment group sent variable. 
We further look at the heterogeneity in treatment effect (HTE) results by 
combining all age group, ethnicity, and race dimensions using a Poisson regression 





the statistical t-test results, we find that matches initiated by females in their forties (i.e. 
the ‘40 to 49’ age group) significantly increased by 53.42% due to the treatment51 (see in 
Model 1 with coefficient value 0.428).52 On the contrary, in Model 2 we find that 
matches received for females in their forties significantly dropped by 31.2%. Therefore, 
our results suggest that the vote-identity revelation feature influenced females in their 
forties to initiate more matches at the cost of receiving less matches. Providing females 
with a push so that they can initiate more matches by themselves was a core reason to 
study our strong signaling feature. For females in their late twenties (‘25 to 29’ age 
group) and thirties (‘30 to 39’ age group), our treatment effects show a fall in their 
matches received to the tune of 24.8% and 36.8% decrease, respectively. For the male 
users, we find consistent increase in self-initiated matches due to the treatment ranging 
from 28% to 67% increase for all their age group cohorts. Interestingly, we find that men 
from older age groups showed higher percentage increase in their matches sent (in Model 
3). 
When looking at heterogeneous treatment effects along users’ race dimension, our 
results show that both self-initiated matches and matches received significantly increased 
by 135.14% and 83.86%, respectively, for Asian female users which supports our 
statistical t-test results. A similar increase in both type of matches due to the treatment is 
seen for mixed race female users, who reported themselves with two ethnic groups in our 
                                                 
51 Note that this result is at 99% level of significance. 
52 Since we are using Poisson regressions, we report the coefficients in Table 12 in 
percentage term using , where e is the exponential constant and  is the 





data set. Finally, for African American females we find that there is only increase in their 
inbound matches by 14.34% magnitude (reported in Model 2 with regression coefficient 
0.134). While looking at males, we find a unique result where Asian men have a negative 
and significant coefficient for their self-initiated matches, accordingly their matches sent 
decreased by 55.07%. This is interesting given that for other ethnic groups (African 
American and mixed race) our feature shows significant increase in outbound matches for 
males. 
Similar to the statistical t-test results, our regression results for curvy females 
show an uptake in matches received. We find that females with curvy physique type 
show 23.12% increase in their received matches (in Model 2). Further, we find treatment 
effects showing decrease in self-initiated matches for females reporting “average” as 
body type. Interestingly, men of all reported body types averages around 75% decrease in 
their self-initiated matches. In our regressions, we didn’t find significant impacts on 
matches received (Model 4) for men at least at 95% level of significance for all the 
demographic dimensions – age groups, ethnicities, and body types.53 
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views, messages, and matches both sent and received please check Appendix Tables A13 





Table 12: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Along Demographic Dimensions 
 Females Males 








 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment 0.223*** 0.173*** 0.103*** 0.048 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Treatment interactions with     
Age groups -     
18 to 24 ages -0.022 -0.104 0.250*** 0.103 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) 
25 to 29 ages -0.012 -0.285*** 0.247*** 0.084 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.06) (0.14) 
30 to 39 ages 0.069 -0.459*** 0.298*** 0.238* 
 (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) 
40 to 49 ages 0.428*** -0.374*** 0.512*** -0.034 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) 
Ethnicities -     
Asian 0.855*** 0.609*** -0.800*** -0.330* 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.19) 
Black 0.041 0.134** 0.244*** -0.032 
 (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) 
Mixed Race 0.528*** 0.696*** 0.193*** 0.093 
 (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15) 
Body types -     
Average -0.390*** -0.069 -1.657*** -1.262 
 (0.15) (0.07) (0.44) (0.78) 
Curvy -0.204 0.208*** -1.210** -1.031 
 (0.15) (0.07) (0.52) (1.09) 
Fit -0.066 -0.024 -1.537*** -1.293* 
 (0.16) (0.07) (0.44) (0.78) 
Observations 3858 3858 8675 8675 
Note. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
5.3 Role of Attractiveness 
Table 13A and 13B presents results from our empirical analysis related to 
attractiveness separately for females and males, respectively. The examination of the 
coefficients of the interaction terms with our vote-identity revelation treatment reveals the 
heterogeneity in treatment effects (HTE) along the attractiveness dimension. At first, we 
look for HTE along users’ own attractiveness levels. Interestingly, for the female cohort 
we didn’t find any significant effect on users matching outcomes when own 





increase in matches sent. Accordingly, a unit increase is treated males’ own attractiveness 
will increase their outbound matches by 3.36% (see Table 13B Model 1). This is counter 
intuitive given that with increase in own attractiveness, male users now showcase more 
confidence to actively reach out to their potential mates, whereas female users do not 
depend on their own attractiveness as a deciding factor under exposure to the treatment. 
Further, our results show an evidence for a positive “ego effect,” whereby treated male 
users decrease their self-initiated views and messages (see Table A16) while 
experiencing increase in matches sent, because of their own attractiveness. 
Next, we analyze the effects for the independent variable that interacts vote-
identity revelation treatment and user’s average voters’ attractiveness levels. For the 
female cohort, as seen across Models 1 in Table 13A, the interaction term shows a 
positive and significant effect for self-initiated matches. Accordingly, a unit increase in 
average male voters’ attractiveness for a female treated user will increase her matches 
sent by 6.82%. This result showcases an “encouragement effect,” whereby increase in 
attractiveness of male voters, who provide ‘like-votes’ to treated female user, can 
encourage the treated female user to increase her self-initiated matching activities with 
potential mates. To look at females’ engagement outcomes, in Table A15, the interaction 
term between treatment and user’s average voters’ attractiveness levels shows a 
significant increase in self-initiated views and messages. The treatment effect on 
outbound messages increases by 4.08% and outbound views increased by 17.47%. This 
suggests that the “encouragement effect” directly fills the gap in the earlier study Bapna 





message others more often and ultimately, achieve more matches. For the male cohort, 
we didn’t find evidence for an “encouragement effect” at the 95% level of significance. 
Finally, we analyze the effects of the three-way interaction term that interacts the 
vote-identity revelation treatment with user’s own attractiveness level and user’s average 
voters’ attractiveness level on the treated users matching outcomes (See even numbered 
models in Table 13A and 13B). For the female cohort, in Model 2 and 4, the three-way 
interaction term shows a negative and significant coefficient for both outbound and 
inbound matches, respectively. Further, in Table A15, the three-way interaction term 
reports negative and significant coefficients for views and messages both sent and 
received (Models 2, 4, 6 and 8). These results show an interesting phenomenon, where 
the joint increment of own attractiveness and average voters’ attractiveness have a 
negative impact on the treated female users online dating outcomes. Accordingly, female 
users have less counts of profile browsing, messaging, and matching. We will have to 
look further to explain this unique result. One explanation is that all users invest more of 
their time in self-improvement by improving their profile pages and profile pictures due 
to exposure to the vote-identity revelation treatment. This will lead to increase in their 
attractiveness. As a result, they have less time to browse other profiles and message their 
potential mates, while engaged in self-improvement. Evidence in support of this 
explanation will require further study. 
For the male cohort, we find a similar negative and significant effect for the 3-
way interaction term for their self-initiated matches only (Model 2 of Table 13B). We 
further report the results from the attractiveness analysis related to male users’ 





Table 13A: Impact of Attractiveness for Females 
 
Match Sent Match Received  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment 0.277*** 0.315*** 0.221*** 0.234*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Treatment *     
Own Attractiveness -0.022 0.020 0.015 0.029 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
Average Voters’ 
Attractiveness 
0.066** -0.055 0.016 -0.002 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Own Attractiveness * 
Average Voters’ 
Attractiveness 
 -0.198***  -0.070*** 
 (0.04)  (0.02) 
     
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 3305 3305 3305 3305 
Note. Treatment is the vote-identity revelation binary indicator variable. Poisson 
regression model is used since dependent variables are count variables. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below coefficient values. All control variables reported in the 
paper are included. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 13B: Impact of Attractiveness for Males 
 
Match Sent Match Received  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment 0.163*** 0.167*** 0.076* 0.073* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Treatment *     
Own Attractiveness 0.033** 0.043** -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Average Voters’ 
Attractiveness 
-0.030* -0.023 0.043 0.036 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Own Attractiveness * 
Average Voters’ 
Attractiveness 
 -0.037***  0.021 
 (0.01)  (0.03) 
     
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 7082 7082 7082 7082 
Note. Treatment is the vote-identity revelation binary indicator variable. Poisson 
regression model is used since dependent variables are count variables. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below coefficient values. All control variables reported in the 





6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The process of selecting a partner is often complicated by the information 
asymmetries between individuals and the known gender asymmetries in preferences and 
inhibitions. With the emergence and growth of online dating sites, we see these platforms 
implementing technology-enabled features that help reduce the information asymmetries. 
Interestingly, we find that these features can also help to mitigate social inhibitions that 
prevent women from initiating interactions with a potential mate.  
In this paper, we employ a randomized field experiment to examine one of these 
technology-enabled features, what we call vote-identity revelation, in partnership with a 
large North American online dating site. The field experiment allows us to causally 
examine the relationship between treated users who can view the identity of the user(s) 
(or voter(s)) who voted them with a like-vote, and the control users who lack this ability 
on a variety of online dating outcomes, like viewing, messaging, and matching with 
another user.  Prior work has demonstrated the importance of sending a ‘weak-signal’ 
through non-anonymous profile browsing for women in particular (Bapna et al. 2016). In 
this paper, we focus on the impact of a feature that allows users to receive a strong-
signal. Further, we looked at heterogeneity in treatment effects along user’s demographic 
dimensions, like age group, ethnicity and body type. Finally, we looked at whether users 
of different personal attractiveness levels or users with different average voters’ 
attractiveness have a divergent reaction to the vote-identity revelation treatment. 
Our results indicate increase in overall activity in the online dating site for both 
female and male cohorts, where more importantly, we found increase in self-initiated 





online dating situations. When we look for the heterogeneity in treatment effects along 
users’ demographic dimensions, we find that different demographic cohorts react 
differently to the treatment. A good example capturing this behavior is showcased by the 
Asian ethnic group. We find that under the effect of the treatment, Asian females show 
significant increase in their match related outcomes, yet Asian men had a significant 
decrease in their self-initiated matches. When looking at the results along the 
attractiveness dimension, we find that different genders react differently to the own 
attractiveness and average voters’ attractiveness constructs. For instance, males show a 
positive “ego effect,” whereby highly attractive males reduce their self-initiated online 
dating engagement activities (i.e. views and messages) yet achieve more out-bound 
matches. This is interesting given that it is common knowledge that in order to increase 
matches users should increase their engagement outcomes. Yet for highly attractive males 
our results show a decrease in engagement outcomes along with an increase in matches. 
For the females, we could see an “encouragement effect,” when like-votes from highly 
attractive potential partners influence female users to increase their online dating 
activities. Given that a key challenge in dating markets is for women to initiate 
interaction with a potential partner, this finding is key to unlock the mechanism to 
overcome this gender specific inhibitions. In conclusion, our results show divergent 
effects due to the treatment along the attractiveness dimensions. Accordingly, the highly 
attractive male cohort of individuals react based on their “ego” due to the treatment by 
strategizing improvements in their matching outcomes, while selectively engaging with 
lesser number of potential partners; while the female cohort of users, react to a boosts in 





group of male users. Further, we find an interesting negative effect when treatment 
interacts with both users’ own attractiveness and average voters’ attractiveness. This 
result can suggest that users take part in self-improvement of their online dating profiles, 
and accordingly reduce dating website engagement and matching activities. This result 
suggests another set of online dating activities, where the access to identity-related 
information of other users makes focal users self-aware of their own identity. 
Accordingly, focal users invest effort in improving own identity by updating their profile 
picture and profile pages, which in turn increases their attractiveness. Finally, this leads 
to overall decrease in engagement and matching activity in the online dating site as users 
are busy updating their own identity. 
Broadly speaking, the results of this study demonstrate that technology-enabled 
features can have an important impact on matching markets and therefore have 
implications for the design of such sites. Online dating sites face the unique challenge of 
wanting to maintain users while still providing them a successful service, i.e. finding 
them a match. While these two objectives are seemingly in conflict with one another, our 
discussions with monCherie.com management has indicated that the incentive to match 
people successfully is high as it creates offline word-of-mouth and generates a new set of 
users. Thus, implementing these technology-enabled features in such a way that can 
maximize the benefit of the users is important, and the results of this study can help 








This dissertation aims to advance the existing literature on how online platforms and IT-
enabled technologies impacts human societal and human relationships situations. By 
examining the role that the technology play towards solving societal challenges, like 
helping individuals find dates online, or in an unintended manner, how technology 
artifacts can exacerbate societal challenges, like prevalence of prostitution in online 
classified advertisement portals, we contribute with this dissertation to the interface 
between technology and human society and human relationships at large.  
Looking with a macroscopic view at human societal challenges, in the first essay 
we study the unintentional consequence of Craigslist website’s entry in United States’ 
counties that can have an impact on prostitution incidences in the country. The essay 
further looks at the potential pathways by which Craigslist’s entry can impact prostitution 
trends. For instance, was the prostitution market facilitated by Craigslist made up of 
independent sex workers, workers coerced under commercial vice groups, or both? To 
examine these questions empirically, we use data of Craigslist’s entry from Craigslist’s 
website and a novel data set on prostitution activities from TheEroticReview.com website. 
Further, using a difference-in-difference estimation approach on a panel data from 1999 
to 2008, we study the impact of Craigslist on prostitution. The findings show that 
Craigslist’s arrival in the market led not only to the overall increase in prostitution 
incidences in the United States significantly, but also increased both independent and 
coerced sex workers who are under the control of commercial vice groups. Further, we 
find Craigslist increased transactions for existing and increased entry of new sex workers 





role that online platforms can play by allowing the operation of illegal markets, like that 
of prostitution. From a practical point of view, the essay identifies potential mechanisms 
that are operating behind the scenes in the online prostitution market. This can make 
policy makers, legal agencies, academicians, law enforcement and other stakeholders 
take policy relevant actions to tackle online prostitution. 
In the second chapter of the thesis, we take a microscopic approach where we 
look at IT-enabled technology feature and its impact on online dating engagement and 
matching outcomes. Extant research has shown the importance of online dating towards 
matching singles with potential mates, and even leading to marriages (Cacioppo et al. 
2013). These online dating websites provide a plethora of IT-enabled features to 
overcome frictions present in the real world. In order to investigate the importance of one 
very essential IT-enabled feature, in this essay we study the impact of vote-identity 
revelation feature on online dating users’ engagement and matching outcomes. 
Particularly, given that different cohorts of users react differently under the influence of a 
treatment, we study heterogeneity in treatment effects along the following dimensions: 
gender, age group, ethnicity, and body type. Finally, we look along the attractiveness 
dimensions for treatment effects as it is ambiguous how attractive users will react to our 
interventions. To study these questions, we collaborate with a large North American 
online dating website and run randomized field experiment to implement vote-identity 
revelation feature. Our results find a significant increase in engagement and matching 
outcomes for both female and male users. We find that different cohorts of users react 
differently to the intervention. More interestingly, we find a positive “ego effect” for 





existing literature in online dating and online ratings. It shows the importance of a 
specific IT-enabled feature that induces user behavior by providing a “strong signal.” 
Further, it not only looks for main treatment effects, but also identifies heterogeneity in 
treatment effects that has practical use for online dating website management in order to 
identify which user cohorts will be most benefited by this IT-enabled feature. This 
approach of identifying treatment effects helps stakeholders to make better website 
design decisions keeping in mind the innate differences among user cohorts.   
There are a few limitations in the two essays that provide scope for future 
research to expand on these works. Firstly, it is possible that other sites or mobile apps 
can facilitate exchange for prostitution as well as the market for online dating. Regarding 
solicitation of sex workers, we considered an online classified advertisement website, 
whereas for the online dating market we partnered with a large online dating website. 
Other platforms that are not an online classified advertisement platform or a major dating 
website, can provide different sets of payoffs and costs which can lead to different 
outcomes in these markets. For instance, mobile apps like Tinder has been reported to be 
used by sex workers, whereas the IT-enabled features of such an app can create a very 
different user experience for legitimate online dating users (Dewey 2014). Secondly, 
geographically both our studies only look at markets in the United States, which leaves 
the scope to study online intermediaries and IT-enabled features relevant to the market 
for sex work and that for online dating in other geographies outside the United States. 
Finally, our studies restrict themselves to a specific timeline and economic lenses. For the 
first essay, we look at the market for sex work between years 1999 to 2008 using a 





2016 spanning three months from a microscopic lens. Accordingly, our studies are 
restricted in providing a full picture, whereby we look at the problems using the entire 
scope of timeframe and economic lenses. This gives scope for future studies that can 
show the impact of online intermediaries and IT-enabled features on these markets 
spanning a larger spectrum of timelines and economic lenses. 
Given the limitations, both essays try to systematically study the impact of online 
intermediaries and IT-enabled features on human societal outcomes, like prostitution, and 
romantic relationship outcomes, like dating. We make the first empirical study when 
looking at the impact of Craigslist’s entry on prostitution incidences, whereas it is the 
first systematic study of the impact of a specific IT-enabled feature, i.e. vote-identity 
revelation feature. As the prevalence of online intermediaries and website features 
become ubiquitous connecting all types of human activities, the study of their impact on 
societal and relational outcomes become important. On one hand, their unintended use 
can create markets for illegal activities to flourish, yet on the other hand, proper use of 
technology artifacts can impact human society in a positive manner, like improving the 
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Appendix 1 - Tables 
 














Alabama 38 67 
 
Montana 0 56 
Alaska 25 30 
 
Nebraska 85 93 
Arizona 4 15 
 
Nevada 10 17 
Arkansas 50 75 
 
New Hampshire 9 10 
California 15 58 
 
New Jersey 5 21 
Colorado 55 64 
 
New Mexico 20 33 
Connecticut 4 8 
 
New York 12 62 
Delaware 3 3 
 
North Carolina 36 100 
Florida 65 67 
 
North Dakota 0 53 
Georgia 71 159 
 
Ohio 22 88 
Hawaii 2 5 
 
Oklahoma 61 77 
Idaho 40 44 
 
Oregon 24 36 
Illinois 95 102 
 
Pennsylvania 20 67 
Indiana 25 92 
 
Rhode Island 4 5 
Iowa 84 99 
 
South Carolina 19 46 
Kansas 95 105 
 
South Dakota 0 66 
Kentucky 52 120 
 
Tennessee 57 95 
Louisiana 10 64 
 
Texas 173 254 
Maine 13 16 
 
Utah 25 29 
Maryland 3 24 
 
Vermont 9 14 
Massachusetts 11 14 
 
Virginia 91 133 
Michigan 61 83 
 
Washington 16 39 
Minnesota 63 87 
 
West Virginia 47 55 
Mississippi 44 82 
 
Wisconsin 39 72 
Missouri 84 115   Wyoming 0 23 



























Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
TER: All Years  
(Using 
Craigslist) 
0.199*** 0.170*** 0.200*** 0.200** 0.47**  
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02)  





0.162*** 0.137*** 0.163*** 0.139* 0.033*  
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02)  




     0.260*** 
     (0.04) 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by counties are reported in parentheses below 
coefficient values. All reported coefficients in the table are for the Craigslist Entry 
regressor. All control variables reported in Table 2 are included.  In Model 5 additional 






Table A3: Covariate Balance Check for One-to-One Without Replacement  
Propensity Score Matching 
Variables 
Unmatched 








Treated Control t-value p-value 
Age 15-19 Proportion U 0.076 0.075 5.2 
 
1.05 0.295 
M 0.075 0.074 4.1 20.7 0.52 0.601 
Age 20-39 Proportion U 0.264 0.236 62.8 
 
12.32 0.000 
M 0.252 0.252 0.1 99.9 0.01 0.992 
Age 40-59 Proportion U 0.278 0.274 15 
 
3 0.003 
M 0.28 0.282 -6.9 53.6 -0.82 0.413 
White Proportion U 0.887 0.901 -9.5 
 
-1.69 0.091 
M 0.9 0.905 -3.4 64.3 -0.45 0.653 
African American Proportion U 0.082 0.077 3.8 
 
0.68 0.499 
M 0.074 0.073 1.1 71.1 0.15 0.885 
Asian Proportion U 0.013 0.004 43.2 
 
10.21 0.000 
M 0.008 0.007 4.6 89.4 0.86 0.393 
Population Size U 120000 25474 54.8 
 
13.02 0.000 
M 55776 46400 5.3 90.3 1.04 0.299 
Poverty U 14068 2975.8 50.4 
 
12.55 0.000 
M 5934.6 4946.5 4.5 91.1 1.32 0.187 
Employed Proportion U 0.944 0.947 -16.4 
 
-2.92 0.003 
M 0.942 0.941 10.1 38.0 1.14 0.255 
Annual Mean Income U 38184 33880 52.2 
 
10 0.000 
M 36534 36607 -0.9 98.3 -0.11 0.916 
Broadband Penetration U 2.957 2.368 61.5 
 
13.36 0.000 
M 2.578 2.56 2 96.8 0.29 0.773 
Police Officers U 218.05 47.068 44.2 
 
10.68 0.000 
M 93.013 74.606 4.8 89.2 1.1 0.270 
Offense Against Family and 
Children 
U 46.677 8.709 41.1 
 
10.05 0.000 
M 19.344 17.3 2.2 94.6 0.47 0.638 
Runaway Individuals U 40.302 6.836 35.1 
 
8.14 0.000 
M 18.592 16.754 1.9 94.5 0.3 0.764 
Drug Related Crimes U 424.41 66.419 50.4 
 
12.61 0.000 








Age 15-19 Proportion 17.574*** 
(6.71) 
Age 20-39 Proportion 11.908*** 
(2.10) 
Age 40-59 Proportion 22.657*** 
(3.72) 
White Proportion 3.400** 
(1.45) 
African American Proportion 2.273 
(1.50) 
Asian Proportion 17.304* 
(9.69) 




Employed Proportion -23.489*** 
(4.11) 
Annual Mean Income 0.000*** 
(0.00) 
Broadband Penetration -0.099 
(0.16) 
Police Officers -0.002** 
(0.00) 
Offense Against Family and Children 0.003 
(0.00) 
Runaway Individuals -0.002 
(0.00) 
Drug Related Crimes 0.003*** 
(0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.2678 
Observations 1757 











Propensity Score Matching (Nearest Neighbor Matching) 






Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 
TER: All Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
0.199*** 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.053** 0.049** 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
TER: Active Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
0.162*** 0.050** 0.057*** 0.038** 0.032* 0.029 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 16735 15492 15966 15598 15448 15357 
 
 
Propensity Score Matching (Kernel Matching) 





Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 
TER: All Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.055** 0.073** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
       
TER: Active Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.043** 0.051* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations  16119 16119 16040 9748 2141 
 
 
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 





Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 
TER: All Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
 0.197*** 0.142*** 0.120*** 0.086*** 0.051*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
TER: Active Years  
(Using Craigslist) 
 0.161*** 0.110*** 0.090*** 0.064*** 0.032** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations  16660 16304 15401 14308 12134 
Note. Model 1.0 is same as Model 5 (DV= TER: All Years - Using Craigslist) and Model 7 
(DV= TER: Active Years - Using Craigslist) from Table 2. NN=k implies k-nearest 
neighbors, where (w/o) is without replacement, and (w) is with replacement. In kernel 
matching, we used Epanechnikov kernel for different values of bandwidth (BW) as 
mentioned in Model 2.1 to Model 2.5. Equally spaced cut-off points of values 2 to 6 were 
used on the co-variates to perform Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). All control variables 





Table A6:  Relationship between Entry Patterns and Existing Prostitution Trends 
 
DV = Craigslist Entry 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
TER: All Years (Using Craigslist) 
0.026   
(0.06)   
TER: Active Years (Using Craigslist) 
 0.027  
 (0.06)  
Log (Commercial Vice Crimes) 
  0.050 
  (0.04) 
R-squared 0.837 0.837 0.837 
F-Stats 5575.22 5575.10 5709.09 
Observations 2049 2049 2049 
Note. The dependent variable for Models 1 to 3 is the binary website entry variable 
‘Craigslist Entry’. Robust standard errors clustered by counties are reported in 
parentheses below coefficient values. All control variables reported in Table 2 are 
included. All models are weighted regressions with county and year fixed effects. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table A7: Falsification Test Using Alternative Crimes 
 
Larceny Arson Burglary 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Craigslist Entry 
-0.034 0.020 -0.019 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
R-squared 0.328 0.027 0.216 
F-Stats 57.949 11.033 56.543 
Observations 16735 16735 16735 
Note. The dependent variables for Model 1 to 3 are the log number of larceny, arson and 
burglary, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by counties are reported in 
parentheses below coefficient values. All control variables and fixed effects reported in 













Both Gender Total Matches 1.043 1.175 12.587 -3.895 0.000 
Female Total Matches 1.265 1.489 17.685 -3.659 0.000 
Male Total Matches 0.918 0.994 8.270 -1.910 0.056 
Female Matches Sent 0.203 0.243 19.717 -2.421 0.015 
Female Matches Received 1.063 1.246 17.298 -3.532 0.000 
Female Messages Sent 2.373 2.667 12.403 -2.632 0.008 
Female Msg Received 9.051 9.684 6.994 -1.894 0.058 
Female Views Sent 10.925 12.740 16.615 -2.994 0.003 
Female Views Received 35.913 37.935 5.632 -1.820 0.069 
Male Matches Sent 0.797 0.860 7.783 -1.667 0.095 
Male Matches Received 0.121 0.135 11.482 -2.322 0.020 
Male Messages Sent 7.636 7.737 1.322 -0.301 0.763 
Male Msg Received 1.904 1.993 4.671 -1.321 0.187 
Male Views Sent 28.033 28.577 1.944 -0.600 0.549 
Male Views Received 7.483 7.681 2.654 -0.899 0.369 
Note. Mean (C) and Mean (T) represents sample means for control group and treatment 
group, respectively. In the data, there are 38,478 females, and 61,522 males, giving the 













Female 18 to 24 Matches Sent 0.388 0.465 19.840 -0.664 0.507 
Female 18 to 24 Matches Received 2.284 3.554 55.622 -2.419 0.016 
Female 25 to 29 Matches Sent 0.584 0.696 19.153 -0.656 0.512 
Female 25 to 25 Matches Received 2.505 3.057 22.029 -1.255 0.210 
Female 30 to 39 Matches Sent 0.502 0.628 25.175 -1.135 0.257 
Female 30 to 39 Matches Received 2.620 2.608 -0.469 0.034 0.973 
Female 40 to 49 Matches Sent 0.634 1.095 72.691 -2.403 0.017 
Female 40 to 49 Matches Received 3.900 4.117 5.571 -0.353 0.724 
Female 50+ Matches Sent 0.882 0.918 4.162 -0.127 0.899 
Female 50+ Matches Received 2.746 3.899 42.010 -1.779 0.076 
Male 18 to 24 Matches Sent 0.962 1.073 11.559 -0.711 0.477 
Male 18 to 24 Matches Received 0.163 0.172 5.254 -0.364 0.716 
Male 25 to 29 Matches Sent 1.837 2.052 11.709 -0.651 0.515 
Male 25 to 25 Matches Received 0.284 0.295 3.626 -0.234 0.815 
Male 30 to 39 Matches Sent 1.949 2.263 16.107 -1.086 0.277 
Male 30 to 39 Matches Received 0.372 0.443 19.010 -1.386 0.166 
Male 40 to 49 Matches Sent 1.754 2.642 50.646 -1.733 0.084 
Male 40 to 49 Matches Received 0.481 0.452 -6.126 0.368 0.713 
Male 50+ Matches Sent 1.831 1.577 -13.886 0.567 0.571 
Male 50+ Matches Received 0.451 0.433 -4.048 0.180 0.857 
Note. Mean(C) and Mean(T) represents sample means for control group and treatment 





Table A10: t-test Results for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for Ethnicity 




Female White Matches Sent 0.594 0.662 11.506 -0.812 0.417 
Female White Matches Received 2.898 3.125 7.821 -0.863 0.388 
Female Black Matches Sent 0.555 0.667 20.106 -0.632 0.528 
Female Black Matches Received 2.692 3.391 25.981 -1.100 0.272 
Female Asian Matches Sent 0.350 0.913 161.351 -2.644 0.009 
Female Asian Matches Received 2.189 4.260 94.563 -2.416 0.016 
Female Mixed Race Matches Sent 0.474 0.901 89.979 -1.276 0.204 
Female Mixed Race Matches Received 1.828 4.160 127.639 -2.643 0.009 
Male White Matches Sent 1.622 1.847 13.833 -1.388 0.165 
Male White Matches Received 0.327 0.341 4.284 -0.533 0.594 
Male Black Matches Sent 1.310 1.970 50.417 -1.987 0.047 
Male Black Matches Received 0.284 0.297 4.734 -0.216 0.829 
Male Asian Matches Sent 1.429 0.725 -49.291 1.957 0.051 
Male Asian Matches Received 0.175 0.136 -22.323 0.878 0.380 
Male Mixed Race Matches Sent 1.646 2.390 45.153 -1.256 0.210 
Male Mixed Race Matches Received 0.303 0.365 20.569 -0.587 0.558 
Note. Mean(C) and Mean(T) represents sample means for control group and treatment group, 
respectively. Highlighted rows show cases with p-value < 0.01. 
 
Table A11: t-test Results for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for Body Types 




Female Average Matches Sent 0.587 0.647 10.291 -0.479 0.632 
Female Average Matches Received 2.227 2.409 8.208 -0.711 0.477 
Female Fit Matches Sent 0.540 0.526 52.955 -1.847 0.065 
Female Fit Matches Received 3.270 3.677 12.436 -0.676 0.499 
Female Curvy Matches Sent 0.536 0.679 26.755 -1.280 0.201 
Female Curvy Matches Received 2.991 4.275 42.907 -2.570 0.010 
Female Full Figured Matches Sent 0.514 0.761 48.191 -1.268 0.206 
Female Full Figured Matches Received 3.050 3.376 10.687 -0.519 0.604 
Male Average Matches Sent 1.376 1.454 5.622 -0.499 0.618 
Male Average Matches Received 0.274 0.287 4.902 -0.510 0.610 
Male Fit Matches Sent 1.875 2.279 21.566 -1.667 0.096 
Male Fit Matches Received 0.360 0.369 2.635 -0.244 0.807 
Male Curvy Matches Sent 0.583 0.946 62.162 -0.975 0.333 
Male Curvy Matches Received 0.083 0.108 29.730 -0.278 0.782 
Male Full Figured Matches Sent 0.207 1.189 474.775 -1.713 0.095 
Male Full Figured Matches Received 0.069 0.270 291.892 -1.817 0.075 
Note. Mean(C) and Mean(T) represents sample means for control group and treatment group, 
respectively. Highlighted rows show cases with p-value < 0.01 
Table A12: Engagement Outcomes for Curvy Females 
Gender Measure Mean (C) Mean (T) Percent Difference t-value p-value 
Female Views Sent 24.2 36.7 51.5 -2.9 0.004 
Female Messages Sent 6.3 8.3 33.4 -2.3 0.019 
Note. Mean (C) and Mean (T) represents sample means for control group and treatment group, 





Table A13: Detailed Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Along Demographic Dimensions For 
Females 
 Views Messages Matches 
 
Sent Rcvd Sent Rcvd Sent Rcvd 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Treatment 0.115*** 0.051*** 0.157*** 0.103*** 0.223*** 0.173*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Age groups -       
18 to 24 ages -0.519*** 0.119*** -0.531*** -0.057*** -0.783*** -0.237*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
25 to 29 ages -0.106*** 0.381*** -0.400*** 0.061*** -0.374*** -0.253*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
30 to 39 ages -0.088*** 0.244*** -0.415*** -0.113*** -0.487*** -0.282*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
40 to 49 ages 0.106*** 0.336*** -0.052** 0.110*** -0.085 0.144*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
Ethnicities -       
Asian -0.085*** -0.208*** 0.073*** -0.108*** -0.013 0.101*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
Black -0.025*** -0.357*** 0.037* -0.398*** 0.028 0.031 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) 
Mixed Race -0.014 -0.008 0.020 -0.074*** 0.155* -0.091** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (0.04) 
Body types -       
Average -0.028** 0.133*** -0.170*** 0.150*** -0.027 -0.337*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
Curvy 0.092*** 0.336*** 0.109*** 0.385*** 0.022 0.132*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.03) 
Fit 0.367*** 0.458*** 0.129*** 0.466*** 0.070 0.054 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.04) 
Treatment interactions with       
Age groups -       
18 to 24 ages -0.272*** -0.101*** -0.069 -0.045* -0.022 -0.104 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.14) (0.07) 
25 to 29 ages -0.106*** 0.064*** -0.068 0.099*** -0.012 -0.285*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.14) (0.07) 
30 to 39 ages 0.023 -0.058*** -0.195*** -0.030 0.069 -0.459*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.13) (0.07) 
40 to 49 ages -0.234*** -0.155*** -0.098** -0.026 0.428*** -0.374*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.14) (0.07) 
Ethnicities -       
Asian 0.464*** 0.418*** 0.597*** 0.557*** 0.855*** 0.609*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.15) (0.06) 
Black -0.205*** -0.073*** 0.054 -0.004 0.041 0.134** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.13) (0.06) 
Mixed Race 0.669*** 0.459*** 0.548*** 0.506*** 0.528*** 0.696*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.17) (0.08) 
Body types -       
Average -0.475*** -0.006 -0.300*** 0.046* -0.390*** -0.069 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.15) (0.07) 
Curvy 0.104*** 0.076*** 0.029 0.013 -0.204 0.208*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.15) (0.07) 
Fit -0.310*** 0.076*** 0.001 0.135*** -0.066 -0.024 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.16) (0.07) 
Observations 3858 3858 3858 3858 3858 3858 




Table A14: Detailed Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Along Demographic Dimensions For 
Males 
 Views Messages Matches 
 Sent Rcvd Sent Rcvd Sent Rcvd 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Treatment 0.052*** 0.012** 0.085*** 0.057*** 0.103*** 0.048 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
Age groups -       
18 to 24 ages -0.503*** -0.888*** -0.527*** -0.816*** -0.543*** -0.965*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
25 to 29 ages 0.079*** -0.141*** 0.004 -0.203*** 0.092*** -0.426*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
30 to 39 ages 0.276*** 0.174*** 0.173*** -0.002 0.183*** -0.083 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) 
40 to 49 ages 0.359*** 0.198*** 0.186*** 0.077*** 0.190*** 0.030 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
Ethnicities -       
Asian -0.221*** -0.538*** -0.241*** -0.533*** -0.489*** -0.653*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10) 
Black 0.014*** -0.222*** 0.157*** -0.152*** -0.095*** -0.121* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
Mixed Race 0.213*** 0.170*** 0.281*** 0.124*** 0.169*** 0.080 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
Body types -       
Average 0.612*** 0.563*** 1.127*** 0.695*** 0.984*** 0.615 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.22) (0.39) 
Curvy 0.507*** 0.158** 0.171* -0.071 0.365 -0.397 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.14) (0.26) (0.55) 
Fit 0.736*** 0.895*** 1.373*** 1.049*** 1.364*** 0.916** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.22) (0.39) 
Treatment interactions with       
Age groups -       
18 to 24 ages 0.013 0.051** 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.250*** 0.103 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.14) 
25 to 29 ages 0.231*** 0.107*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 0.247*** 0.084 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.14) 
30 to 39 ages 0.068*** 0.097*** 0.182*** 0.227*** 0.298*** 0.238* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.13) 
40 to 49 ages 0.139*** 0.093*** 0.274*** 0.283*** 0.512*** -0.034 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.14) 
Ethnicities -       
Asian -0.051*** -0.245*** -0.640*** -0.472*** -0.800*** -0.330* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.19) 
Black 0.181*** 0.133*** 0.172*** 0.123*** 0.244*** -0.032 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.13) 
Mixed Race 0.137*** 0.014 0.050** 0.085** 0.193*** 0.093 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.15) 
Body types -       
Average -0.869*** -0.678*** -1.812*** -1.184*** -1.657*** -1.262 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.44) (0.78) 
Curvy 0.965*** -0.051 -1.183*** -0.869*** -1.210** -1.031 
 (0.07) (0.12) (0.20) (0.29) (0.52) (1.09) 
Fit -0.796*** -0.614*** -1.695*** -1.085*** -1.537*** -1.293* 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.44) (0.78) 
Observations 8675 8675 8675 8675 8675 8675 




Table A15: Detailed Impact of Attractiveness For Females 
 Views Messages Matches 
 Sent Received Sent Received Sent Received 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Treatment 0.153*** 0.179*** 0.062*** 0.073*** 0.211*** 0.230*** 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.277*** 0.315*** 0.221*** 0.234*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Own Attractiveness -0.146*** -0.141*** 0.203*** 0.203*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 0.282*** 0.282*** -0.336*** -0.339*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness -0.063*** -0.083*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treatment *             
Own Attractiveness -0.128*** -0.125*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.008 0.026* 0.073*** 0.083*** -0.022 0.020 0.015 0.029 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness 0.161*** 0.122*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.003 -0.011 -0.007 0.066** -0.055 0.016 -0.002 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Own Attractiveness * Average 
Voters’ Attractiveness 
 -0.160***  -0.061***  -0.101***  -0.061***  -0.198***  -0.070*** 
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
             
Controls             
Age groups dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ethnicity dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Body type dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
             
Intercept 3.504*** 3.501*** 4.619*** 4.618*** 1.992*** 1.991*** 3.204*** 3.204*** -0.432*** -0.436*** 1.183*** 1.183*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 3305 
Note. Treatment is the vote-identity revelation binary indicator variable. Poisson regression model is used since dependent variables 
are count variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient values. All control variables reported in the paper are 




Table A16: Detailed Impact of Attractiveness For Males 
 Views Messages Matches 
 Sent Received Sent Received Sent Received 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Treatment 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.127*** 0.138*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.163*** 0.167*** 0.076* 0.073* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Own Attractiveness -0.093*** -0.094*** 0.032*** 0.031*** -0.112*** -0.122*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.001 -0.001 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.001 0.001 0.016* 0.017* -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Treatment *             
Own Attractiveness -0.083*** -0.080*** -0.000 0.001 -0.051*** -0.018*** 0.014 0.018* 0.033** 0.043** -0.014 -0.020 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Average Voters’ Attractiveness -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.011** -0.010* -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.025** -0.021* -0.030* -0.023 0.043 0.036 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Own Attractiveness * Average 
Voters’ Attractiveness 
 -0.014***  -0.004  -0.095***  -0.013*  -0.037***  0.021 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
             
Controls             
Age groups dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ethnicity dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Body type dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
             
Intercept 4.114*** 4.114*** 2.858*** 2.858*** 2.728*** 2.726*** 1.479*** 1.479*** 0.581*** 0.581*** -1.151*** -1.151*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 7082 
Note. Treatment is the vote-identity revelation binary indicator variable. Poisson regression model is used since dependent variables 
are count variables. ‘Msg Rcvd’ stands for messages received. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient values. 




Appendix 2 - Figures 
 
 













Figure A3 - Comparison of Effect Sizes 
Note: This plot reports effect sizes (in the y-axis) on prostitution incidences due 
to Craigslist entry. Prostitution count under the definition of TER: Active Years 
(Using Craigslist) is the dependent variable used to plot the graph. All estimates 
reported in the figure are statistically significant at 5% level of α. X-axis reports 
different cases of the dependent variable based on prostitutes’ review counts. 





Appendix 3 - Neighboring County Distance Measure 
 
To check for the spillover effect mechanism, we used a sub-sample of pairs of 
neighboring counties where exactly one county has Craigslist entry and the other do not 
have Craigslist entry. In identifying each county-pair identified, we calculate the distance 
between these counties using the haversine formula, which accounts for the spherical 
nature of Earth’s surface when calculating the shortest distance between two coordinates. 
In our case, each of these points is the latitude and longitude associated with each county, 




• : latitude of county 1 and latitude of county 2 
• : longitude of county 1 and longitude of county 2 
• Radius = 3,959 miles (i.e. Earth’s radius) 
County-pairs that have the shortest distance are identified as neighboring counties 
and are used in our analysis. In our analysis, we restrict the length of our panel to the 
time period that only includes the first year of Craigslist entry to avoid the possibility 
of Craigslist entering in the neighboring county in subsequent years. To avoid the 
possibility of neighboring counties with Craigslist in an earlier period having an 




and removed county-pairs in which the second closest neighboring county to the 
focal county had experienced Craigslist entry in an earlier year. Through this 
procedure, we identified 126 county-pairs that fulfilled these criteria. 
 
